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ABSTRACT

REVIEW OF WHISTLEBLOWING STUDIES IN ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
EXAMINING CORPORATE INTERNAL WHISTLEBLOWING POLICIES

By Lei Gao, Ph.D.

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of the Doctor of
Philosophy in Business (Concentration in Accounting) at Virginia Commonwealth University.

Virginia Commonwealth University, 2017

Director: Alisa Brink, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Accounting, School
of Business, Department of Accounting

This dissertation consists of three studies. The first study provides a review and synthesis
of past accounting research regarding factors that influence whistleblowing. Building upon the
model by Near and Miceli (1995), I summarize experimental accounting studies based on five
determinants of whistleblowing intentions: characteristics of the whistleblower, characteristics of
the report recipient, characteristics of the wrongdoer, characteristics of the wrongdoing, and
characteristics of the organization. Suggested directions for future research of each determinant
are discussed in this paper.
The second study is a content analysis to examine the variation of organizations’ internal
whistleblowing policy, including both the content characteristics of the policy and the linguistic
characteristics of the policy. In terms of the content characteristics of the whistleblowing policy,
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this study focuses on who is covered in the policy, where to report, employees’ responsibility,
corporate investigation procedures, disciplinary action against the wrongdoer, and anti-retaliation
policy. In terms of the linguistic characteristics of the internal whistleblowing policy, this study
focuses on the types of pronouns, the language uncertainty of the policy, and the tone of the policy
(positive or negative). Furthermore, the overlaps between the content characteristics and the
linguistic characteristics are also identified.
The third study is a 2 by 2 between-subjects experiment to investigate the best design of
companies’ internal whistleblowing policy. By breaking the internal whistleblowing policy into
the reporting policy (responsibility to report and reporting channel) and the anti-retaliation policy
(protection against retaliation), the experiment manipulates the type of pronouns for the reporting
policy (first-person pronoun reporting policy or third-person pronoun reporting policy) and type
of pronouns for the anti-retaliation policy (first-person pronoun anti-retaliation policy or thirdperson pronoun anti-retaliation policy). This study predicts that compared to third-person pronouns,
first-person pronouns encourage whistleblowing in the reporting policy, but discourage
whistleblowing in the anti-retaliation policy. The highest reporting intention can be achieved when
the reporting policy is worded in first-person and the anti-retaliation policy is worded in thirdperson.

Part One: Whistleblowing Studies in Accounting Research: A Review of Experimental
Studies on Determinants of Whistleblowing

I.

INTRODUCTION

The term whistleblowing is derived from a sporting event where the referee blows the
whistle to stop an illegal or foul play (Qusqas and Kleiner 2001). Researchers from different
disciplines define whistleblowing in various ways (Erkmen et al. 2012). As discussed by Brennan
and Kelly (2007), the more widely-accepted and most frequently used definition of whistleblowing
in accounting research is by Near and Miceli (1985). They define whistleblowing as “the disclosure
by organization members (former or current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under
the control of their employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to effect action” (Near
and Miceli 1985, 4). This definition has been adopted by numerous whistleblowing studies (e.g.,
Keenan 2002; King 1997; Miceli and Near 1994, 1997; Miceli et al. 1999; Near et al. 2004; Ayers
and Kaplan 2005).
Starting in the 1980s, a number of researchers from many disciplines began to investigate
ways to promote whistleblowing (Keil et al. 2010). Employee tips are considered the most
common method of detecting fraud (ACFE 2014; Dyck et al. 2010). However, numerous surveys
show that not all observed fraud is reported (Hudson Employment Index 2005; Miceli et al. 2008;
Ethics Resource Center 2012; Ethics Resource Center 2013). The Ethics Resource Center (2013)
found that 41 percent of employees observed misconduct in their workplace, but out of the 41
percent of employees who observed misconduct, around 33 percent remained silent. There have
1

been many accounting researchers investigating ways to promote reporting fraudulent accounting
behavior or auditing misconduct. Providing a systematic review of the extant whistleblowing
literature in accounting research could help identify gaps in the research investigating the obstacles
that stop witnesses from blowing the whistle. In this study, I review and summarize accounting
literature that examines whistleblowing. I first describe the whistleblowing model used in this
study in Section II. Section III reviews and synthesizes the literature on each determinant of
whistleblowing. I present overall conclusions in Section IV.
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II.

WHISTLEBLOWING MODEL

Near and Miceli (1995) propose a model of effective whistleblowing by focusing on
terminating the wrongdoing. They propose that there are five primary factors that influence
whistleblowing effectiveness: characteristics of the whistleblower, characteristics of the report
recipient, characteristics of the wrongdoer, characteristics of the wrongdoing, and characteristics
of the organization.
Near and Miceli (1995) define effectiveness of whistleblowing as “the extent to which the
questionable or wrongful practice is terminated at least partly because of whistleblowing and
within a reasonable time frame” (681). Whistleblowers report the wrongdoing with the purpose
of terminating the wrongdoing. Their intention to blow the whistle is closely related to whether
they believe the wrongdoing will be stopped (Near et al. 2004). The model by Near and Miceli
(1995) was developed from the perspective of terminating the wrongdoing and it is broader and
covers most of the relevant parties involved in a whistleblowing scenario in accounting. This
model has been used extensively to explain witnesses’ reporting intentions. For example, based on
the model proposed by the Near and Miceli (1995), Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005)
explore the correlation of whistleblowing intentions, actions, and retaliation. Curtis and Taylor
(2009) classify the five components of effective whistleblowing into personal characteristics and
organizational variables and investigate the influence of identity disclosure, situational context,
and personal characteristics on witnesses’ whistleblowing intentions.
3

As shown in Figure 1, building upon the Near and Miceli (1995) model, I review and
summarize whistleblowing accounting literature based on the five determinants of effective
whistleblowing, namely characteristics of the whistleblower; characteristics of the report recipient,
characteristics of the wrongdoer, characteristics of the wrongdoing, and characteristics of the
organization.1
[Insert Figure 1 here]

1

Researchers have also provided other models investigating whistleblowing intentions. For example, Hooks et al.
(1994) develop a whistleblowing model in the context of the internal control and external audit functions of fraud
detection. They illustrate the roles of internal control and external audit in encouraging unethical behavior reporting.
Schultz et al. (1993) propose and test a model illustrating that a person’s willingness to report unethical behavior is
determined by the perceived seriousness of the act, personal responsibility for reporting, and personal cost of
reporting. Extending this model, Kaplan and Whitecotton (2001) show that auditors’ reporting intentions are
influenced by their perceptions of the seriousness of the act, personal responsibility of reporting, personal cost of
reporting and commitment to the accounting profession. Gundlach et al. (2003) develop a social information
processing framework by integrating the power, justice, and prosocial literature on whistleblowing, and they argue
that individuals' attributions and responsibility judgments for wrongdoing, as well as their cost-benefit analyses of
acting, influence their emotions and decisions to report the wrongdoing.
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III.

DETERMINANTS OF WHISTLEBLOWING

Characteristics of the Whistleblower
The first determinant of effective whistleblowing is characteristics of the whistleblower.
Miceli et al. (2008) classified personal predictors of whistleblowing into personality characteristics,
moral judgment, and demographic characteristics. Personality characteristics or dispositional
characteristics are internal factors that cause an event or behavior. Moral judgment refers to the
ability to judge one's own and others' behavior as right or wrong (Li et al. 2014). Demographic
characteristics involve factors such as age, race, sex, working experience and so on.
Whistleblowers are individuals who witness certain unethical behavior and speak up to an
appropriate person with the purpose of correcting the wrongdoing. Apart from external situational
factors, individuals’ decision-making processes are heavily influenced by their personality
characteristics, moral judgement, and their demographic characteristics (Miceli et al. 2008; Bartels
et al. 2015). Thus, it is important to understand how these characteristics contribute to the
likelihood of reporting unethical conduct.
Prior Literature
Personality Characteristics. Prior literature has examined some elements of
characteristics of whistleblowers that impact reporting in accounting setting. In terms of
personality characteristics and moral judgement, Curtis and Taylor (2009) look at the witness’
5

whistleblowing in public accounting firms from the perspectives of individuals’ locus of control
and ethical style. Locus of control refers to how one person attributes events to either internal
factors (e.g., internal hard work) or external factors (e.g., luck). Ethical style describes an
individual’s approach of evaluating ethical dilemmas, and White (2007) classifies ethical styles as
either caring or judging. Curtis and Taylor (2009) employ a within-subjects scenario-based survey
method and find that auditors with an internal locus of control and auditors who exhibit a judging
ethical style are more likely to report unethical conduct.
Dalton and Radtke (2013) examine the joint effect of Machiavellianism and ethical
environment on whistleblowing. By conducting a between-subjects experiment with MBA
students, they find that Machiavellianism is negatively related to whistle-blowing.
Machiavellianism refers to a term that some social and personality psychologists use to describe a
person’s tendency to deceive others to achieve personal goals (Christie and Geis 1970).
Brink et al. (2015a) investigate whether the witnesses’ personality traits and ethical
position are associated with their whistleblowing intention. They use the Big Five Factors
(extroversion, openness to experience, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and agreeableness)
developed by John et al. (1991) and updated by John et al. (2008) to measure personality. By
conducting a between-subjects experiment with upper level accounting students, they find a
positive relation between the presence of higher levels of the alpha and beta meta-traits and
whistle-blowing behaviors. The alpha trait consists of agreeableness, conscientiousness, and
emotional stability (neuroticism). Beta traits are traits that indicates self-development and
preservation. Building on the Forsyth (1992) model of ethical orientation, which states that
individuals with higher levels of idealism will have a defined set of behaviors whereas more
relativistic individuals would not have a defined set of behaviors, they predict and find that
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individuals with idealistic ethical position are more likely to report than individuals with
relativistic ethical position.
Demographic Characteristics. Most experimental studies collect participants’
demographic information, such as age, gender and work experience. In general, the results show
that years of work experience, gender, and type of organization are not significantly associated
with their reporting intention (e.g., Kaplan et al. 2011; Seifert et al. 2010; Brink et al. 2013).
Some studies use demographic variables as the variables of interest and test how
demographic variables interact with other variables (e g., Kaplan et al. 2009; Liyanarachchi and
Adler 2011; Erkmen et al. 2014). Kaplan et al. (2009) examine the interaction between witness’
gender and anonymousness of reporting channel on individuals’ intentions to report fraudulent
financial reporting. They conduct an experiment with evening MBA students and find that female
participants’ reporting intentions are higher than male participants only under the anonymous
reporting channel condition.
Liyanarachchi and Adler (2011) recruit Australian accountants to participate in a quasiexperimental survey investigating the effect of accountants’ age, gender and retaliation on their
whistleblowing intentions. In their study they vary the degree of retaliation through manipulation
and find a significant three-way interaction among participants’ gender, age and retaliation. They
find that among early career accountants, male accountants are more likely than female
accountants to blow the whistle. When accountants are 45 years old and above, they respond to
retaliation differently depending on their gender. Specifically, female accountants’ reporting
intention in this age group tends to decline as the retaliation threat increases. In contrast, the change
in retaliation threat has little impact on male accountants’ reporting intentions.
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Erkmen et al. (2014) conduct a survey with accounting professionals in Turkey to examine
the effect of witness’ age, gender and types of wrongdoing on whistleblowing intentions. They
find female accounting professionals are more likely to blow the whistle than male accounting
professionals when the fraud involves fake invoices, and older accounting professionals are more
likely to blow the whistle than younger professionals when the fraud involves misclassification of
sales and profits.
In summary, accounting researchers investigating characteristics of whistleblowers often
collect witnesses’ demographic information such as gender, age, working experience, etc. These
demographic variables can sometimes interact with other variables, such as degree of retaliation
or reporting channel, to influence reporting intentions. Accounting studies also measure
whistleblowers’ personality characteristics, such as locus of control. Personality characteristics
play an important role a person’s decision making process. Personality traits, such as locus of
control and Machiavellianism, influence individuals’ decisions to report unethical behavior (see
summary in Table 1.1).
[Insert Table 1.1 Here]
Directions for Future Research
Studies indicate that apprenticeship training (work-based secondary education) can alter
some aspects of personality. For example, Bolli and Hof (2014) find that apprenticeship training
can reduce neuroticism and increase agreeableness and conscientiousness. Prior research indicates
that certain personality traits are associated with a lower likelihood of reporting unethical conduct.
Thus, it would be interesting to explore what external factors, such as training, would effectively
alter the personality traits that are associated with low whistleblowing intentions.
Characteristics of the Report Recipient
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Characteristics of the report recipient involves two categories. First, it involves the
characteristics of the actual person who receives the report, such as the report recipient’s power
status and credibility (Near and Miceli 1995). Second, it involves the characteristics of the
reporting channel, such as the administration of the reporting channel.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires that public companies maintain an anonymous
reporting channel for whistleblowers. There is no specific guideline as to how the reporting
channel should be administered (SEC 2003, 20). Some firms have the reporting hotline
administered by internal auditors while others choose to have it administered by external auditors.
The characteristics of the report recipient is an important factor that influences whether the
witnesses believe that the report will handled properly and thus will subsequently influence their
reporting intentions.
Prior Literature
Characteristics of the Report Recipient. In terms of the studies investigating the
characteristics of the actual person who receives the report, Kaplan et al. (2010) conduct an
experiment by manipulating whether the report recipient is the supervisor’s supervisor or an
internal auditor, and whether there is existence of an unsuccessful social confrontation when
meeting with the transgressor to discuss the fraud. Using a 2 by 2 between-subjects experiment
with MBA students, they find that the witnesses’ reporting intentions to the supervisor’s supervisor
are stronger than to an internal auditor when there is an unsuccessful social confrontation with the
supervisor. However, reporting intentions to the supervisor’s supervisor are not stronger than to
an internal auditor when there is no social confrontation.
Kaplan et al. (2011) take a step further to investigate whether the potential information
recipient’s inquiry enhances reporting intentions or not, and they vary the source of inquiry as
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either internal auditor or external auditor. The results show that participants’ whistleblowing
intentions to an inquiring auditor are stronger than their whistleblowing intentions to a noninquiring auditor, and their whistleblowing intention to an internal auditor are stronger than their
intentions to an external auditor.
Characteristics of the Reporting Channel. In terms of the characteristics of the reporting
channel, some researchers look at whether the reporting channel is anonymous or not, and others
investigate whether the reporting hotline is administered internally or externally. With an internally
administered hotline, the report recipient is an employee of the company, whereas with an
externally administered hotline the report recipient belongs to an independent organization outside
the company.
Several studies investigate the effect of anonymous reporting channel. Kaplan and Schultz
(2007) conduct an experiment and find that the existence of an anonymous channel reduces the
likelihood of reporting to non-anonymous channels. Curtis and Taylor (2009) conduct a survey
with auditors to examine their whistleblowing intentions under three forms of identity disclosure,
namely disclosed identity format, anonymous format, and protected identity format. Protected
identity means the witnesses’ identity is known to those who must investigate, but not to the
perpetrator. They find that reporting intentions are significantly lower under a disclosed identity
format, and there was no significant difference in reporting intention between anonymous and
protected identity formats. Kaplan et al. (2012) further investigate witnesses’ preference of
reporting channels with an experiment. They find witnesses’ reporting intentions to an anonymous
channel is higher than to a non-anonymous channel only when a previous whistleblowing outcome
is negative.
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Several additional studies investigate the effect of whether the reporting channel is
administered internally or externally. Kaplan et al. (2009) examine intentions to report a fraudulent
act to an anonymous reporting hotline that is administered either internally by company personnel
or externally by a third-party provider. They find that the reporting intentions to the internal hotline
are significantly higher than to the external hotline. Zhang et al. (2013) argue that an internal
reporting channel might not be always better than an external reporting channel at encouraging
whistleblowing. By conducting an experiment with M.B.A students, they find that participants’
reporting intentions to an external hotline are higher when the organization has a history of poor
responsiveness to whistleblowing and when participants are low on the proactivity scale. Proactive
behavior is defined by Grant (2000,436) as ‘taking initiative in improving current circumstances”.
In summary, prior studies investigating the characteristics of the report recipient focus on
the following categories: the characteristics of the actual person who receives the report and the
characteristics of the reporting channel (see summary in Table 1.2). Studies show that report
recipients’ power influences witnesses’ reporting intentions under certain conditions, such as when
there was unsuccessful social confrontation with the supervisor. Certain report recipients’
behavioral characteristics also influence witnesses’ reporting intention, such as recipients’ inquiry
of unethical behaviors. In terms of the reporting channel, witnesses prefer an anonymous reporting
channel over a non-anonymous reporting channel, especially when a previous reporting outcome
was negative. Witnesses in general prefer to report internally first before reporting externally.
However internal reporting is not always preferred, and witnesses’ reporting intentions to an
external hotline are higher when organizational response is poor and when witnesses are low on
the proactivity scale.
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[Insert Table 1.2 Here]
Direction for Future Research
Corporations prefer witnesses to report unethical behavior internally, as external reporting
brings reputation damage and high litigation risk (Berry 2004; Davidson and Worrell 1988;
Laczniak and Murphy 1991). As documented above, whether an internally administered channel
is preferred or not depends on environmental conditions (Zhang et al. 2013). For example, an
internally administered reporting channel might not be viewed as a good place to report if the
wrongdoing is unethical pro-organizational behaviors, because the report recipient might be less
likely to correct an unethical behavior that is beneficial to the company. Future research could
further explore under what conditions one reporting channel is better than others by examining the
reporting channel’s interactive effect with the primary beneficiary of the wrongdoing. For example,
when the fraud is for the wrongdoer’s personal benefits, witness’ reporting intention to the
internally administered hotline might be higher than to the externally administered hotline because
such wrongdoing provides no benefits to the company and the company may be more likely to
take corrective action. On the other hand, if the wrongdoing is unethical pro-organizational
behavior, the witness might be more likely to report to an external channel because the proorganizational wrongdoing provides certain benefits to the company and the company might not
take corrective action after receiving the report.
Under SOX, the reporting channels are established by audit committees (SEC 2003, 20). It
is also important to explore the effects of audit committee quality on encouraging reporting
unethical behaviors. Stronger audit committees, which have more external members and meet
more regularly, may indicate that there is higher possibility of terminating the wrongdoing when
it is reported. There are a number of studies in the auditing literature investigating the relation
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between the audit committee qualities and earnings manipulation. Accounting literature can be
extended by bridging the audit committee literature and whistleblowing literature.
Characteristics of the Wrongdoer
Prior Literature
In terms of the characteristics of the wrongdoer, Near and Miceli (1995) focus on the
wrongdoers’ power and credibility. As illustrated in their model, the characteristics influencing
wrongdoers’ power include their position in hierarchy, pay grade, professional status, education
level, etc.

Characteristics influencing wrongdoers’ credibility include perceived motives,

performance, etc. As stated by Near and Miceli (1995), the wrongdoers’ power and credibility
influence whether the company will take corrective actions against the wrongdoer and wrongdoing.
With the purpose of terminating the wrongdoing, the witnesses assess the wrongdoers’ power and
credibility before reporting the wrongdoing. Thus, the wrongdoers’ characteristics are important
factors that influence the witnesses’ whistleblowing intentions.
The Wrongdoers’ Power. Taylor and Curtis (2013) investigate the auditors’ likelihood of
reporting observations of colleagues’ unethical behavior by varying whether the wrongdoer is a
co-worker or supervisor and whether the previous organizational response is strong or not. They
find that auditors are more likely to blow the whistle when the wrongdoer is a co-worker than
when he is the supervisor only when there is no previous organizational response to unethical
behaviors. If the prior organizational response is strong, auditors are more likely to report the
supervisor than the co-worker.
The Wrongdoers’ Credibility. Kaplan (1995) investigates the effect of the wrongdoer’s
work performance on auditor reporting intentions upon discovery of unethical conduct. In his study,
the unethical conduct is premature sign-off of an audit procedure, and the wrongdoer’s work
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history is manipulated as either good or poor. He finds that the witnesses’ reporting intention are
significantly stronger when the wrongdoer has poor work history. Robertson et al. (2011) extend
Kaplan (1995) by examining the effects of a wrongdoer-auditor’s performance and likeability
reputation on fellow auditors’ intentions to report. Through an experiment with auditors, they find
that reporting intentions are lower when the wrongdoer has a good performance reputation and
when the wrongdoer is more likeable. They find that the reporting intention is the lowest when the
wrongdoer is both likeable and has good performance reputation.
In summary, empirical studies examining the effect of wrongdoers’ characteristics on
whistleblowing are limited. In general these studies find that the witnesses’ reporting intention is
lower when the wrongdoer is credible with good work performance and high power in the
organization. Furthermore, strong prior organizational responses help increase the reporting
intentions when the wrongdoer has high power (see summary in Table 1.3).
[Insert Table 1.3 Here]
Directions for future research
First, companies want their employees to have credibility and good work performance.
However, when such employees also engage in unethical behaviors, the witnesses’ reporting
intentions are low. Future research could investigate variables that interact with wrongdoers’
credibility and work performance to encourage reporting on employees who commit unethical
conduct but have good work performance.
Second, extant whistleblowing literature investigating wrongdoer characteristics have been
focusing on single wrongdoer committing the unethical activity alone. In reality, most of the major
organizational frauds over the past decade, such as Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and HealthSouth,
have been committed through the collusion of multiple employees involving the CEO, CFO and

14

others (Free and Murphy 2014). Free and Murphy (2016, 19) state that “in major accounting frauds
(see, e.g., COSO 2010) or complex identity frauds, for example, it is unlikely that any one
individual has the resources, access and capacity to construct a sophisticated fraud without the
assistance of others.” Scholars suggest that more research should be done on fraudulent acts
involving multiple employees. (e.g., Hochstetler 2001; van Mastrigt and Farrington 2011). Free
(2016) reviews popular frameworks used to examine fraud and suggests three areas where there is
considerable scope for academic research. One of the areas he suggests for further exploration is
the nature of collusion in fraud. Future accounting research on whistleblowing can incorporate cooffending situations and investigate how multiple wrongdoers interact with other variables
influencing witnesses’ whistleblowing intentions.
Third, whistleblowing research investigating wrongdoer’s characteristics focuses on a
wrongdoer who is in the same organization as the witness. It is getting more and more common
for companies to outsource part of the organizational functions to other companies. As discussed
by Ayers and Kaplan (2005), the impact on reporting intentions is not clear when the wrongdoer
is a non-employee. In such a situation, reporting intentions might be higher since witnesses may
feel that retaliation possibility will be minimal when reporting on consultants. However,
organizational employees may believe that it is not their responsibility to report the wrongdoing
of consultants, making reporting less likely. Ayers and Kaplan (2005) test a whistleblowing model
under the setting that the wrongdoer is a consultant of the company. In their study, the wrongdoer
is a non-employee across treatments, thus wrongdoer is not a between-subjects variable. As a result,
their study doesn’t answer the question of whether there is a significant reporting difference
between an employee wrongdoer and non-employee wrongdoer. Future research can
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experimentally manipulate whether the wrongdoer is an employee or non-employee to examine
how this impacts witnesses’ reporting intentions.
Characteristics of the Wrongdoing
Near and Miceli (1995) separate the characteristics of the wrongdoing into three
dimensions: the organization’s dependence on the wrongdoing, the credibility of the
whistleblower’s evidence, and the legality of the alleged wrongdoing. Each of the three dimension
influences witnesses’ perception of whether the report will be handled properly or not. As proposed
by Near and Miceli (1995), the greater the dependence of the organization on the wrongdoing, the
less likely the company will take corrective actions; the more convincing that wrongdoing has
occurred, the more effective the whistleblowing will be; and the less ambiguous that the
wrongdoing is illegal, the more effective the whistleblowing will be.
Prior literature
Organization’s Dependence on the Wrongdoing. In terms of the organization’s
dependence on the wrongdoing, Kaplan and Schultz (2007) vary the primary beneficiary of the
wrongdoing within-subjects and examine witnesses’ decisions to report and choice of reporting
channel. They ask participants to indicate their reporting intention under three case scenarios:
financial statement fraud, theft, and a non-fraudulent case. Financial statement fraud is considered
benefiting both the company and the perpetrator; while the theft case benefits only the perpetrator
and harms the company. The third non-fraudulent case involves a case of an employee’s poor work
quality being discovered by another employee. These three cases represent a variety of
questionable acts that exist in companies. They find that reporting intentions are lower under
financial statement fraud than under the theft case condition. Also, using a within-subjects design,
Robinson et al. (2012) investigate the effect of the type of fraudulent act on whistleblowing
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intention by looking at whether the fraud is theft or financial statement fraud. They find lower
whistleblowing intentions for financial statement fraud than theft, and whistleblowing intentions
are lower for immaterial than material financial statement fraud.
Kaplan et al. (2009) examine whether witnesses’ reporting intentions are influenced by the
following two types of wrongdoing: fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation of assets.
They find that there are higher reporting intentions for misappropriation of assets compared to
fraudulent financial reporting, but only when the reporting channel is anonymous. Kaplan et al.
(2011) further examine the interactive relation among types of fraudulent acts, auditor inquiry, and
reporting recipient. They do not find a systematic difference between misappropriation of assets
and fraudulent financial reporting, nor does the type of fraudulent act interact with whether the
auditor engages in inquiry or the report recipient (e.g., internal versus external auditor).
Credibility of the Whistleblower’s Evidence. Brink et al. (2013) conduct a 2 by 2
between-subjects experiment with MBA students. They investigate evidence strength and internal
rewards on witnesses’ reporting choice between internal reporting and external reporting to the
SEC. They find that the likelihood of reporting internally is greater than to the SEC. When
evidence is strong, internal rewards increase reporting to SEC; when evidence is weak the presence
of an internal incentive decreases SEC reporting intentions. Brink et al. (2015b) investigate the
interaction between evidence strength and the bystander effect. They find that when the evidence
is strong, individuals with sole knowledge are more likely to report than when others are aware of
the fraudulent act (the bystander effect). However, results indicate no bystander effect when
evidence of fraud is weak.
Legality of the Alleged Wrongdoing. The only study related to this concept is Brink et al.
(2015a). They conduct an experiment by manipulating different materiality levels of the
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wrongdoing and examine the subsequent effects on respondents. In the high materiality scenario,
the inappropriate revenues represent ten percent of the annual revenues of the firm. In the low
materiality scenario, revenues represent one percent of the annual revenues. The results show that
the reporting intentions are lower when the fraud is low in materiality.
In summary, accounting studies investigating the organization’s dependence on the
wrongdoing have mixed results (see summary in Table 1.4). Studies from Kaplan and Schultz
(2007) and Robinson et al. (2012) examine the primary beneficiary of frauds using within-subjects
design. They find that witnesses are less likely to report financial statement fraud than theft. Other
studies vary the fraudulent acts as either financial statement fraud or misappropriation of assets
between subjects and they do not find a significant reporting difference between the two. It is
important to note that the actual wrongdoing behavior and the organization’s dependence on the
wrongdoing are different concepts. In these studies, it is difficult to conclude whether the results
are due to the difference of the actual wrongdoing behavior (manipulating financial statement vs.
stealing from the company) or difference in whether the organization benefits from the wrongdoing.
In terms the credibility of evidence and the legality of the unethical act, there are limited
experimental studies investigating these two concepts. Within the limited studies, results show that
stronger evidence strength and high materiality level increase the witnesses’ reporting intentions.
[Insert Table 1.4 Here]

Direction for future research
Free (2015) reviews popular frameworks used to examine fraud and suggests three areas
where there is considerable scope for academic research. One of the areas is rationalization of
fraudulent behaviors by offenders. Wrongdoings that are conducted in the name of benefiting the
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organization are often used as rationalization for committing fraud. Future studies can examine the
effect of rationalization on witnesses’ reporting intentions by varying the purpose of the fraudulent
act.
Many corporations’ whistleblowing standards require reporting the misconduct in “good
faith,” a term that every employee is apt to understand differently (Heard and Miller 2006). Some
companies state that the whistleblower is subject to disciplinary actions if not reporting in good
faith (Heard and Miller 2006). Reporting a misconduct that lacks convincing evidence may lead
to questions regarding whether the reporting is in good faith or not. This may discourage the
witnesses from reporting the questionable act. Future research can investigate whether a lack of
evidence is related to questions of acting in good faith, and how such questions might influence
reporting intentions.
Characteristics of the organization
From the perspective of encouraging whistleblowing, characteristics of the organization
can be classified into the following categories: appropriateness of whistleblowing, organizational
climate, and organizational structure (Near and Miceli 1995). Appropriateness of whistleblowing
refers to the degree to which whistleblowing is considered part of one’s regular responsibility.
Organizational climate refers to the ethical climate, which can encourage whistleblowing or
discourage whistleblowing. In terms of organizational structure, one key variable is the level of
bureaucracy.
As discussed by Near and Miceli (1995), the organization’s structure and climate can
reflect and influence its employees’ resistance to change. The witnesses’ whistleblowing intentions
are influenced by their perception of organizational support and whether the company is willing
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to change the wrongful acts. Thus it is important to investigate how the characteristics of the
organization can improve whistleblowing.
Prior literature
Appropriateness of Whistleblowing. In terms of the appropriateness of whistleblowing,
one key factor is the company’s whistleblowing policy. A whistleblowing policy may include the
witnesses’ responsibility of reporting, reporting channels and protection against retaliation
(Hassink et al. 2007). Wainberg and Perreault (2016) conduct an experiment with graduate
students by varying the existence of an explicit whistleblower anti-retaliation policy. They find
that a vivid anti-retaliation policy may actually have the opposite of the intended effect and lower
whistleblower’ reporting intentions because it increases the salience of retaliatory threats.
Organizational Climate. Organizational climate on whistleblowing can be influenced by
many factors, such as the organization’s response to prior whistleblowing incidents, ethical
environment, and internal rewards for whistleblowing. Zhang et al. (2013) investigate the
interactive effects of previous whistleblowing outcomes, reporting channel, and personal
proactivity scale. They vary the outcome for the previous whistleblower as either positive or
negative. They find that when organizations have a history of negative outcomes for previous
whistleblowers and when witnesses are low on the proactivity scale, the witnesses are less likely
to report to internal hotlines and more likely to report via external hotline.
Taylor and Curtis (2013) conduct an experiment in an audit environment by manipulating
whether the organization takes responsive actions against ethics violations and whether the
wrongdoer is a supervisor or a peer of the witness. They find that when organizational response is
strong, the witnesses are more likely to report to supervisors than peers. Without strong
organizational response, they are more likely to report to peers than supervisors.
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Dalton and Radtke (2013) examine the joint effect of Machiavellianism and ethical
environment on whistleblowing. They manipulate the organization’s ethical environment by
varying whether the company’s ethical standards are emphasized or not. They find that emphasis
on ethical environment increases witnesses’ reporting, especially when the witnesses are high in
Machiavellianism. Xu and Ziegenfuss (2008) conduct a survey with internal auditors to examine
whether a cash reward or employment contracts have an impact on auditors’ whistleblowing
intentions. The results indicate that internal auditors are more likely to report wrongdoing when a
cash reward or employment contract reward is provided.
Brink et al. (2013) further investigate how internal rewards influence witnesses’ choice of
reporting channel. They find a greater likelihood of reporting internally than to the SEC. Their
results show that when evidence is strong, internal rewards increase reporting to SEC; and when
evidence is weak the presence of an internal incentive decreases SEC reporting intention. Seifert
et al. (2010) apply the theory of organizational justice to the design of whistleblowing policies and
procedures. They manipulate the organizational procedural justice (e.g., consistency of procedures
and freedom from bias in carrying out procedures), distributive justice (e.g., resolutions are
perceived as fair), and interactional justice (e.g. individuals are treated with dignity and respect).
They conduct an experiment with internal auditors and management accountants and find that
organizational procedural justice, distributive justice, and interactional justice increase the
likelihood that an organizational accountant would internally report financial statement fraud.
Organizational Structure. Brennan and Kelly (2007) examine the relation between audit
firms’ organizational structures and trainee auditors’ whistleblowing intentions. They conduct a
survey of a group of trainee accountants in the UK and measure the participants’ response to their
organization’s formal structures, training, and whistleblowing policy. They find that having
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formal structures is positively associated with employees’ reporting intentions. Training offered
by the organization increases employees’ reporting confidence.
Lowe et al. (2013) investigate the effect of a financial sub-certification procedure in an
organization on witnesses’ reporting intentions. Financial sub-certification procedure means the
witnesses’ supervisors sign and certify that there is no fraud on the financial statements. Lowe et
al. (2013) argue that the witnesses with knowledge of a superior who committed a fraudulent act
and certified that there is no fraud have lower reporting intentions. Using an experimental approach
with MBA students, they manipulate two between-participant variables: (1) the presence or
absence of sub-certification by the transgressor and (2) the timing of fraud discovery, either before
or after the reports have been filed with the SEC. They find that when sub-certification is present,
witnesses’ reporting intentions were diminished compared to when sub-certification is absent.
Timing of the discovery of the fraudulent act has no effect on reporting intentions.
In summary, appropriateness of whistleblowing is closely related to responsibility of
reporting. There are limited studies investigating what organizational characteristics improve the
responsibility of reporting. Researchers find that prior organizational response, ethical
environment, internal reward, and organizational justice all, to some extent, encourage
whistleblowing. In terms of organizational structure, studies show that the formal structure is
positively associated with employees’ reporting intentions. Asking supervisors to certify the
financial statements lowers the witnesses’ reporting intentions when there is financial statement
fraud (see summary in Table 1.5).
[Insert Table 1.5 Here]
Directions for future research
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A company’s internal whistleblowing policy provides detailed explanations and guidance
for employees who witness unethical behaviors. Hassink et al. (2007) conduct a content analysis
of whistleblowing policies of leading European countries and find that there is variation of content
included in companies’ whistleblowing policies. For example, firms have different reporting
channels. Fifty percent of the sample provide detailed contact information of where to report, and
78 percent of the sample mentioned that the whistleblower’s identity will be kept anonymous.
Apart from variation of actual content, there is also language variation when firms describe their
whistleblowing policy. The tone of language used in corporate communication with employees
can provide different direction to the potential whistleblowers (Schwartz 2002). Use of negative
tone language, such as “don’t do x” seems to provide clearer direction than the use of positive tone
(Schwartz 2002). Bethoux et al. (2007) and Logsdon and Wood (2005) document that employees
can recognize the value assigned by the corporation to ethics and the reporting of wrongdoing
through the language the company uses. Future research could conduct controlled experiments to
investigate the effects of different language features in whistleblowing policies on the employees’
perceived responsibility of reporting and their reporting intentions.
Another organizational characteristic worth exploring is the confidentiality agreement
existing between employees and organizations. The U.S. Department of Justice and Securities and
Exchange Commission have used whistleblower bounties to encourage employees to report
corporate wrongdoing to the SEC. However, it is a common practice for firms to sign
confidentiality agreements with employees to prevent employees from disclosing sensitive data to
unauthorized parties. As discussed by Strassberg and Harrington (2015, 1), it was inevitable that
“employers, employees and government lawyers would conflict on the use of confidentiality to
protect sensitive corporate information.” In April 2015, the SEC filed an enforcement action
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against KBR, Inc. (KBR) and alleged that KBR required employees to sign a confidentiality
statement containing “improperly restrictive language” that could discourage employees from
reporting potential violations of the federal securities laws to the SEC (SEC 2015). It is important
to note that the SEC acknowledged that it did not know of any efforts by KBR to enforce these
confidentiality provisions nor was the Commission aware of any employees who had in fact been
dissuaded from becoming whistleblowers. KBR settled the SEC’s allegations without admitting or
denying liability. Thus it is still debatable whether there is any empirical evidence that a standard
confidentiality agreement discourages employees from blowing the whistle to the SEC. As signing
a confidentiality agreement is such a popular mechanism to protect sensitive information, future
research can investigate whether a confidentiality agreement leads to lower whistleblowing
reporting to the SEC. If this does discourage employees from reporting possible federal securities
law violations to the SEC, it is worth exploring whether there are any methods that can protect
corporate sensitive information without discouraging whistleblowing to the SEC.
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IV.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this review is to provide a synthesis of past research in accounting regarding
determinants of whistleblowing intentions and to identify promising avenues for future research.
Building upon the whistleblowing model by Near and Miceli (1995), prior literature is summarized
based on five determinants of effective whistleblowing: characteristics of the whistleblower;
characteristics of the report recipient, characteristics of the wrongdoer, characteristics of the
wrongdoing, and characteristics of the organization.
Overall, there has been extensive research in accounting literature investigating ways to
encourage whistleblowing. Building upon the model of effective whistleblowing by Near and
Miceli (1995), this review should help identify directions for future research to extend our
understanding of the determinants effective whistleblowing.
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Part Two: A Content Analysis of Organizations’ Internal Whistleblowing Policies

I. INTRODUCTION
A series of accounting scandals that began with Enron’s collapse in 2001 has brought
unprecedented attention to the importance of deterring fraud. Prior researchers document that one
of the most common method of detecting fraud is employee tips (ACFE 2014; Dyck et al. 2010).
Corporations prefer employees to report unethical behavior internally, as external reporting brings
reputation damage and high litigation risk (Barnett et al., 1993; Vandekerckhove and Commers,
2004; Van Es and Smit, 2003). Many organizations in both the public and private sectors have
formal whistleblowing policies/procedures (Vandekerckhove and Lewis 2012). These policies
guide employees through the ethical decision making process. Numerous firms spend an enormous
amount of funds on the implementation of these policies, such as code of ethics trainings and
courses (Robertson and Fadil 1998).
Emphasizing the importance of written standards to promote internal reporting of ethical
standard violators, Section 406 of SOX requires public companies to disclose whether they have
adopted a code of ethics that includes written standards of procedures to promote reporting
unethical conduct (SEC 2003). The SEC does not provide specific guidance as to how the code of
ethics should be addressed, what procedures the company should develop, and the types of
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sanctions that the company should impose. Thus, little is known about the current administrative
status of codes of ethics for U.S. firms.
This study performs a content analysis of U.S. listed companies’ internal whistleblowing
policy section in the code of ethics. Content analysis is “a systematic, replicable technique for
compressing many words of text into fewer content categories based on explicit rules of coding”
(Steve 2001, 17). This study focuses on both the content and the linguistic characteristics of the
policy. Content characteristics refer to what information is included in the policy. Linguistic
characteristics refer to the language used in the policy.
This study offers several contributions. First, the results provide useful insights to
companies and regulators. Prior content analysis on corporate whistleblowing procedures and
codes of ethics primarily focus on firms listed in European countries. The regulatory environment
is different for U.S. firms than for international firms. This study examines the corporate
whistleblowing procedures of firms that are listed on the U.S. stock market. As discussed earlier,
although Section 406 of SOX requires public companies to disclose whether they have formal
standards to promote reporting of unethical behaviors, it does not provide specific guidelines in
terms of the administration of the policy. This study provides insight into companies’
implementation and administration of Section 406 of SOX requirements.
Second, effective communication is considered one of the key components to a code of
ethics’ success (Stevens 2008), and language plays a critical role in effective communication. This
study explores the words and language styles used in companies’ whistleblowing policies. It helps
to identify trends and patterns within whistleblowing policies. As such, this study answers calls
for further investigation of the design and the implementation of effective internal whistleblowing
policies/procedures (Vandekerckhove and Lewis 2012).
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Third, through computerized content analysis, many variables that used to be difficult to
measure can now be generated for future empirical studies. For example, a computerized content
analysis of internal whistleblowing policies can measure linguistic variables, such as the voice
(active versus passive), usage of proper nouns, and emotional tone. These variables are difficult to
measure by hand but can be measured properly through computerized algorithms. Thus, this study
answers calls for research that identifies operational measures of language characteristics in
corporate codes of ethics (Logsdon and Wood 2005).
The remainder of this study is organized as follows: the next section includes background
information and the literature review; section III provides the development of the research
questions. Section IV describes the data selection, methodology, and the codification process. The
results and summary of the study are displayed in Section V; and Section VI provides conclusion
of the study, implications, limitations, and suggestions for future research.
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II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Internal Whistleblowing Policies
Accounting literature investigating employees’ whistleblowing intentions focuses on the
following determinants: characteristics of the whistleblower, characteristics of the report recipient,
characteristics of the wrongdoer, characteristics of the wrongdoing, and characteristics of the
organization. Of these, characteristics of the organization are some of the most important
determinants in encouraging internal whistleblowing. As discussed by Near and Miceli (1995), the
organization’s structure and climate can influence employees’ resistance to change. Witnesses’
whistleblowing intentions are influenced by their perception of organizational support and whether
the company is willing to change the wrongful acts. Prior research finds that prior organizational
response, ethical environment, internal reward, and organizational justice can encourage
whistleblowing (e.g., Seifert et al. 2010; Xu and Ziegenfuss 2008; Brink et al. 2013; Dalton and
Radtke 2013; Taylor and Curtis 2013;Zhang et al. 2013).
Although there are a number of studies investigating the effect of characteristics of the
organization on whistleblowing, one underexplored area of firm characteristics is the company’s
internal whistleblowing policies. Corporations prefer witnesses to report internally due to the
potential for negative consequences of external reporting, such as reputation damage and litigation
risk (Berry 2004; Davidson and Worrell 1988; Laczniak and Murphy 1991). To promote internal
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whistleblowing, many organizations in both public and private sectors have formal whistleblowing
policies/procedures (Vandekerckhove and Lewis 2012).
Limited prior research investigates corporate whistleblowing policies. However, Barnett et
al. (1993) find that there is a significant increase in the number of internal disclosures and a
significant decrease in the number of external disclosures after a company implements an internal
whistleblowing policy. Vandekerckhove and Lewis (2012) identified and compared five internal
whistleblowing guidelines from the following four categories: issues relating to who, about what,
and how; issues relating to defining the responsibility to report; will there be retaliations; and issues
relating to what constitutes the investigation procedure.2 They find that there are contradictions
and omissions among the five guidelines and most of the guidelines fail to pay enough attention
to the process of handling concerns. They call for further investigation of corporations’ formal
internal whistleblowing polices and state that there is an urgent need to understand the design and
implementation of effective internal whistleblowing policies/procedures.
Hassink et al. (2007) conducted a content analysis of whistleblowing policies and the
related codes of ethics of 56 leading European companies. They find that there are significant
variations in corporate internal whistleblowing procedures. For example, firms have different
reporting channels. Fifty percent of the sample provided detailed contact information of where to
report, and 78 percent of the sample mentioned that the whistleblower’s identity will be kept
anonymous.
Prior studies investigating the linguistic characteristics of firms’ formal reporting
procedures focus on the code of ethics. Farrell and Farrell (1998) investigated codes of ethics of

2

The five internal whistleblowing guidelines are: The Council of Europe Resolution 1729; Recommended Principles
for Whistleblowing Legislation; European Union Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Opinion; International
Chamber of Commerce’s Guidelines on Whistleblowing; and the British Standards Institute’s Whistleblowing
Arrangements Code of Practice 2008.
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five large enterprises in Australia. They used functional linguistics as the instrument of analysis.
Functional linguistics describes how language works to achieve a particular purpose, taking into
account of the role of language and the parties involved in the communication (Collerson 1994;
Eggins 1994). After investigating the number and frequency of relational clauses (e.g. X is Y, X
must be Y) and passive words, they suggested that the language used in the code of ethics is
intended to create and maintain a hierarchical relationship between employer and employees.
Schwartz (2004) conducted a series of interviews with employees, managers, and ethics
officers from four large Canadian companies regarding the content and language of firms’ codes
of ethics. One of the important features in this study involves employees’ perceptions of the tone
of codes of ethics (i.e., negative language such as ‘do not do x’ versus positive or aspirational
language such as ‘do y’ or ‘try to do y’). The results indicate that employees prefer the use of a
negative tone in the code of ethics. Interviewees indicated that a negative tone provides clearer
expectations than a positive tone. In addition, there is a greater chance of misinterpretation by the
reader when the code is written in positive or open-ended language (e.g., ‘‘not all gifts are
unacceptable’’) versus when it is worded in negative or specific language (e.g., ‘‘do not accept
cash gifts’’).
Logsdon and Wood (2005) explored the linguistic characteristics of corporate codes of
ethics in six global petroleum companies. They identified words or sentences that can signal the
company’s orientation, implementation, and accountability to stakeholders and to employees.
They suggest that employees can recognize the value assigned by the corporation to ethics and the
company’s attitude towards reporting of wrongdoing through the language the company uses. They
call for more research on the language used in codes of ethics/policies to develop additional
operational measures for language characteristics.
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Erwin (2011) investigated the relation between the quality of the code of conduct and the
corporate’s ethical performance. The following components were identified to calculate an overall
grade of the quality of the code of conduct: public availability, tone from the top, non-retaliation
and reporting, commitment and values, risk topics (e.g., Does the Code address all of the
appropriate and key risk areas?), comprehension aids (e.g., Does the Code prove any
comprehension aids such as Q&As or FAQs?), and presentation and style (e.g., the layout, fonts,
and pictures). Each category had a specific rating determined by a panel of experts from the
Ethisphere Council, which is a membership group of the Ethisphere Institute that defines and
measures corporate ethical standards. The sample’s ethical performance was estimated by the
presence of each company in the lists for sustainability (Dow Jones Sustainability Index),
corporate citizenship (100 Best Corporate Citizens), ethical practices (World’s Most Ethical
Companies), and consumer perception (World’s Most Respected Companies). They found that the
quality of code of conduct is positively associated with a full range of ethical rankings.
In summary, prior research indicates that internal whistleblowing policies vary in terms of
the content and language, and that language pattern and style can influence employees’ perceptions
of the value conveyed by the policy (Logsdon and Wood 2005; Hassink et al. 2007; Bethoux et al.
2007; George et al. 2014). While acknowledging the importance and impact of prior research,
more research is needed to fully understand the current state of corporate internal whistleblowing
policies. Prior empirical studies focus on either the actual content of the internal whistleblowing
policy or the language of the policy. However, there is little research investigating both the content
characteristics and linguistic characteristics simultaneously. Thus, little is known about whether
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certain sections of the reporting policy are more likely to be associated with certain specific
linguistic characteristics.
Second, to my knowledge, there has been no study investigating the characteristics of the
internal whistleblowing policies of firms listed in the U.S. stock market. Prior studies focused on
international firms such as European companies or Canadian companies (Schwartz 2004, Hassink
et al. 2007). As the regulatory environment is different for U.S. firms, results from these studies
may have limited implications for U.S. firms.
Third, there are very few linguistic variables in corporate internal whistleblowing policies
that have been identified and operationalized. This may be due in part to the difficulty of coding
policy content by hand and the amount of subjectivity involved in the coding process. As
technology advances, there are many computerized tools developed to measure linguistic variables
based on reliable natural language processing algorithms (e.g., DICTION 5.0, STYLE,
ATLAS.ti™ , and LIWC). DICTION 5.0 is a dictionary-based content analysis program (Hart
1984, Hart 2000) that is used extensively to analyze narrative discourse. STYLE is a computer
program that analyzes the surface characteristics of a document such as sentence length and type,
word usage, and other readability measures (Cherry and Vesterman 1991). ATLAS.ti™ is a
computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software package. It can provide a systematic analysis
of text-based documents. LIWC is described as:
A software program that contains a number of dictionaries associated with various
constructs, such as negative emotions, positive emotions, causation, insight, inclusive,
exclusive, and so on. The program searches a given text for the words contained in each
dictionary and outputs the percentage of hits associated with the given dictionary.
(Donohue et al. 2014, 283).
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Many of these tools are used to generate linguistic variables in financial accounting research by
analyzing the linguistic characteristics of annual reports.
Linguistic Characteristics in Financial Accounting
Goldberg (1964, 348) claimed “it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the problem of
communication is the axial problem in accounting.” Language is a critical component of effective
communication. There is a growing body of research that uses computerized language processing
tools to investigate the value of linguistic features in financial reporting.
Davis et al. (2008) used textual-analysis to measure the degree of optimistic and pessimistic
language in a sample of approximately 24,000 earnings press releases issued between 1998 and
2003. They used DICTION 5.0 (Hart 2000a, 2001) to analyze narrative discourse, and to obtain
systematic measures of the levels of optimistic and pessimistic language used in earnings press
releases by counting the number of optimistic and pessimistic words (Hart 1984, 1987, 2000a,
2000b, 2001). They found that optimistic or pessimistic language usage is a predictor of future
firm performance.
Sadique et al. (2008) investigated the relation between stock market reactions and the tone
of the public by analyzing the tone of the media news articles and earnings press releases. They
use DICTION 5.0 to generate a measure of positive and negative tone by calculating the percentage
of negative words and positive words. Their results indicate that positive tone is associated with
increases in a firm’s stock returns and decreases in stock volatility. A negative tone is associated
with decreases in stock returns and increases in stock price volatility.
Goel et al. (2010) employ natural language processing (NLP) tools and linguistic features
of annual reports to identify fraudulent annual reports. They create a methodology which employs
machine-learning techniques to proactively detect fraud by building an automated fraud classifier.
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The linguistic features were extracted by using DICTION 5.0 and STYLE. They found that
linguistic features are an important tool that can be used to detect fraud. Their fraud detection
model’s accuracy rate increased from 56.75 percent to 89.51 percent after incorporating the annual
reports’ linguistic characteristics.
Goel and Gangolly (2012) investigated whether there is any systematic difference in terms
of the language and presentation style used between fraudulent annual reports and non-fraudulent
annual reports. They used DICTION 5.0, STYLE, and LIWC (Pennebaker et al. 2007) to extract
linguistic markers. They found that fraudulent financial accounting is associated with the following
linguistic cues: use of complex sentential structures; low readability; use of positive tone; use of
passive voice; use of uncertainty markers; and use of adverbs.
In summary, prior studies employed several computerized tools to measure linguistic
features in financial documents. Linguistic features, such as pronouns and language tone, play an
important role in predicting firm performance and fraudulent reporting. As discussed in the
previous section, there are calls for further research to investigate the characteristics of corporate
internal reporting policies by incorporating analyses of content and linguistic features. This study
takes an exploratory approach to investigate internal whistleblowing policies through a
computerized content analysis. Specifically, this study analyzes the characteristics of
organizations’ internal whistleblowing policies’ content and language. By incorporating
computerized language processing tools to analyze the linguistic features of internal
whistleblowing policies, this study measures many linguistic features that have not been identified
in previous whistleblowing policy content analyses.
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III. RESEARCH QUESTIONS DEVELOPMENT

The Content Characteristics of Internal Whistleblowing Policy
Consistent with Vandekerckhove and Lewis (2012), this study focuses on the following
components in defining whistleblowing policy content. The first component is “general content,
scope, and tone.” This includes the executives’ opening letter, the description of the importance of
the policy, and any comprehension aids. The second component is “who, what, and where.” This
includes who is covered by the policy, what is the responsibility of the employee, and where to
report. The third component is “Investigation procedures, wrongdoer disciplinary action, and antiretaliation policy.” It defines the investigation procedures, the disciplinary actions against
wrongdoers, and the anti-retaliation policy. In summary, the first research question is:
RQ1: What are the content characteristics of companies’ internal whistleblowing
policies?
The Linguistic Characteristics of Internal Whistleblowing Policy
In terms of the linguistic characteristics of the internal whistleblowing policy, this study
focuses on the following characteristics: the types of pronouns, the uncertainty language, and the
linguistic tones. First, the types of pronouns in the policy. This includes: first person pronouns (I,
me, mine, and my), second person pronouns (you, your, and yours), and third person pronouns (he,
she, him, her, his, and hers). Companies vary the use of pronouns in narrative disclosures (Goel et
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al. 2010). For example, Walmart describes part of its whistleblowing policy in first person
pronouns:
Q: My manager told me to markdown several items to zero but leave them on the
shelves to sell because it will “help our inventory.” Is this acceptable? A: No. The
manipulation of markdowns is not only dishonest, but it also could affect the store’s
profitability. If you’re being instructed to do this, report it to Global Ethics immediately.
(Walmart 2016, 23).
On the other hand, American Express’s whistleblowing policy uses third person pronouns:
Q: Katerina’s leader tells her to delay sending an invoice to Vendors Payable until next
quarter. Katerina assumes her leader is trying to give their department some leeway to meet
next quarter’s quota. Should she follow her leader’s request? A: No. All goods and services
must be accounted for in the period incurred. Because Katerina’s leader is asking her to
create an inaccurate record, she should report the situation immediately to her business
unit’s Controller or Compliance Officer. (American Express 2016, 18).
As exemplified in the above two examples, the language used in organizations’
whistleblowing policies varies in the type of pronouns used. One thing to note is that in the
American Express example, the third person is a fictitious person named “Katerina” rather than
just a generic third person, such as “an employee”. Thus, this study separates third person pronouns
into two sub categories: a generic third person and a fictitious third person.
The second linguistic feature is the level of uncertainty conveyed by language in the
whistleblowing policy. Many studies use uncertainty markers to study style, expression, affect,
and attitude in text (Lackoff 1973; Glover and Hirst 1996; Uzuner and Katz 2005; Rubin et al.
2006). If more uncertainty words are used in a whistleblowing policy, the employee may believe
that management is not taking whistleblowing seriously, and they may feel uncertain about their
responsibility to report a wrongdoing.
Finally, the third linguistic feature is the tone of the whistleblowing policy. The tone will
be analyzed by classifying the text as positive or negative (Goel et al. 2010; Abrahamson and Amir
1996; Smith and Taffler 2000; Henry 2006). Prior studies show that negative words may trigger
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stronger emotional reactions than similar positive words (Brink and Rankin 2013). Further, People
may weigh a negative voice more heavily than a positive voice (Maxham and Netemeyer 2003;
Mahajan et al. 1984). Negative words in an internal whistleblowing policy may trigger more
attention from the employee than positive words, and the employee may have stronger emotional
reactions to negative words than to positive words.
In summary, the second research question is summarized as:
RQ2: What are the linguistic characteristics of companies’ internal whistleblowing
policies?
The Relation between Content Characteristics and Linguistic Characteristics
The last part of the content analysis will focus on the relations among the various content
and linguistic characteristics identified above. By investigating the content characteristics and
linguistic characteristics at the same time, this study can identify the frequency of overlaps between
the content and the language characteristics. This process can help answer questions such as: What
is the tone normally used when describing employees’ responsibility to report wrongdoing? Do
the types of pronouns vary between sections of the whistleblowing policy? Thus, the third research
question is summarized as follows:
RQ3: Do companies prefer to describe certain information content using certain
linguistic features in their internal whistleblowing policies?
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IV. SAMPLE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY

Sample Selection
A sample of 50 companies’ internal whistleblowing policies was collected for analysis.
The companies selected are the 50 largest U.S. companies by stock market capitalization as of
March 31, 2016. Prior research adopts a similar sample selection approach. For example, Hassink
et al. (2007) conducted a content analysis of whistleblowing policies of European companies. The
sample in their study is the Ftse Eurotop-100, which features the largest European listed
companies.
The internal whistleblowing policies were extracted from the companies’ code of ethics.
Under section 406 of SOX, public companies should provide the code of ethics and make it
publicly available. Companies without a code of ethics must explain the reasons in their annual
reports. Under the SEC’s definition, the code of ethics should include written standards and
procedures for the promotion of reporting unethical or illegal behaviors. Starting in 2003, public
companies listed on New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Nasdaq Stock Market (NASDAQ)
are required to have code of business ethics and make it publicly available (NYSE 2009; NASDAQ
2016). Thus, public companies internal whistleblowing policies can be found from their code of
ethics, which are publicly available on their websites.
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Methodology
This study was conducted through a qualitative research method. Qualitative research is an
exploratory approach. In qualitative research, hypotheses are not tested, and meanings and themes
can emerge from data gathered through observations (Corbin and Strauss 1990). A qualitative
content analysis is “a systematic, replicable technique for compressing many words of text into
fewer content categories based on explicit rules of coding” (Steve 2001, 17).
The qualitative data analysis software for this study is ATLAS.ti™. As mentioned earlier,
Atlas ti is a computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software package. It can provide a
systematic analysis of text-based documents. Although this software has not been widely used in
accounting research, it is a well-recognized qualitative data analysis software (QDAS). As
reviewed by Woods et al. (2015), there is an increasing number researchers using ATLAS.ti™.
Specifically, they document 349 studies using ATLAS.ti™ between 1994 and 2013. It is one of
the two longest used QDAS tools (Muhr 1991; Richards and Richards 1991).
The Codification Process
As discussed earlier, the content analysis focuses on three areas of companies’ internal
whistleblowing policies: the content characteristics of the internal whistleblowing policy; the
linguistic characteristics of the policy, and the relation between the content characteristics and the
linguistic characteristics of the policy.
Coding of the Content Characteristics
The content characteristics of companies’ internal whistleblowing policies are coded in the
software by hand. The researchers read through all the fifty whistleblowing policies in the software
and classify the content of the policies into different content characteristics codes following the
coding index displayed in Table 2.1.
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[Insert Table 2.1 Here]
Coding of the Linguistic Characteristics
This study investigates three linguistic characteristics: types of pronouns, language
uncertainty, and linguistic tone. Coding the types of pronouns was conducted via the “auto-coding”
feature in ATLAS.ti™ first, and then the generic third person and the fictitious third person
pronouns were separated by hand. The other two linguistic characteristics were coded through the
“auto-coding” feature in ATLAS.ti™. The “auto-coding” feature is a process of automatically
searching for frequency counts of words based on a defined word list throughout the document
and coding findings in the software.
The list of uncertainty words used in this study was taken from Loughran-McDonald
dictionaries of uncertainty words (Loughran and McDonald 2011, Bodnaruk et al. 2015). The list
of words indicating linguistic tones was derived based on prior studies by Abrahamson and Amir
(1996), Smith and Taffler (2000), and Henry (2006). The words list for each of the three linguistic
characteristics is included in the Appendix B. Through auto-coding, the frequency counts of these
words exist in the whistleblowing policy can be identified and coded. The three linguistic variables
and words list are listed below.

1. The types of pronouns

First person, Second person, Generic third person,
Fictitious third person (See Appendix B)

2. The scale of uncertainty language

See Appendix B

3. The linguistic tone

See Appendix B

Through the “co-occurrence” tool in ATLAS.ti™, the overlapping occurrence of different
characteristics can be identified. The “co-occurrence” tool provides a cross-tabulation of codes
and the number within each cell is a frequency count of how often each pair of codes co-occurs.
This process helps identify the frequency with which one code co-occurs with another code.
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V.

RESULTS

Coding Reliability
As discussed earlier, the linguistic characteristics are coded automatically by using the
ATLAS.ti™ software and the content characteristics are coded by hand. To measure the reliability
of the coding process, there is a second coder to manually code the linguistic characteristics and
the content characteristics. The intra-class correlation coefficients (ICC) between the coders are
0.75 for the content characteristics and 0.89 for the linguistic characteristics. Prior studies
suggested that values from 0.75 to 1.00 for continuous scales is considered good to excellent interrater reliability (Fleiss 1987; Streiner and Norman 1995; and Cicchetti 1994). Thus, the coding
process in this study has good inter-rater reliability.3
The Content Characteristics of Internal Whistleblowing Policy
Table 2.2 summarizes the percentage of each content characteristic’ existence out of 50
firms. Panel A of Table 2.2 reports the contents of general content, scope, and tone. It summarizes
the percentage of the sample that have executive opening letters (39 of 50, 78%), the existence of
executive’s photo in the letter (29 of 50, 58%), specific requirement of employees to read and
understand the policy (39 of 50, 78%), policy compliance affirmation with periodic certification

3

To manually code the linguistic characteristics and content characteristics for all the 50 firms is not practical,
because it would involve manually identify thousands of codes. Thus, the authors randomly picked several firms for
the second coder. The second coder only manually coded the linguistic characteristics for five firms and coded the
content characteristics for three firms. I believe that if the inter-rater reliability is good for the randomly selected
firms, it would suggest good coding reliability for the 50 firms.

42

(16 of 50, 32%), content related to policy training (30 of 50, 60%), and content specifically state
that employee compliance with the policy is a condition of employment (4 of 50, 8%). Firms use
several methods to help employees to interpret the policy, including Q/A, Frequently Asked
Questions (FAQ), case scenario, and decision assistance tools. Companies provide decision trees
or decision flow charts to help employees make better decisions. This study classified these
features as decision assistance tools. Results show that 64% of the sample has a Q/A section (32
of 50), 62% have decision assistance tools (31 of 50), and only 10% have case scenarios to help
interpret the policy (5 of 50).
Panel B of Table 2.2 reports the content related to who is covered by the policy, what is
the responsibility, and where to report. In terms of who is covered by the policy, the results show
that all of the 50 firms specifically mention that corporate employees are covered by the policy,
62% of the policies state that board of directors are also covered by the policy (31 of 50), 42% of
the sample requires that the entire group needs to follow the policy (21 of 50), 28% state that their
policies also apply to business partners (14 of 50), and 36% state their policies apply to temporary
workers or contract workers (18 of 50). Only 8% of the sample specifically mentions that
executives are also covered by the policy (4 of 50).
In regard to defining employees’ responsibility to report, 86% of the sample requires
employees to ask questions when they are not sure what to do (43 of 50), 98% of the sample
requires employees to report concerns (49 of 50), 16% of the sample states that employees should
report concerns even if no problem is found (8 of 50), and 50% of the sample requires employees
to report concerns in good faith (25 of 50). When it comes to mangers’ responsibility in handling
wrongdoing reports, 56% of the sample requires managers to create a reporting environment (28
of 50), 48% requires managers to lead by example (24 of 50), 46% mentions that managers should
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respond to ethical reporting (23 of 50), and only 4% state that maintaining the non-retaliation
policy is also the mangers’ responsibility (2 of 50).
In terms of where to report wrongdoing, the most common channel is reporting to
supervisors (48 of 50, 96%). Out of the 50 firms, 22% of the firms explicitly state that employees
should report to their supervisor first (11 of 50), 66% of the sample implicitly require supervisor
reporting by listing supervisors ahead of other reporting channels (33 of 50), 80% have Human
Resources (HR) as a reporting channel, 72% have the legal division as a reporting channel, 82%
mention that employees can report to the compliance/ethics office, 6% mention the external auditor
as a reporting channel, and only 4% mention that employees can report to their co-worker.
Furthermore, 84% of the sample mention that there are anonymous reporting channels available.
Panel B of Table 2.2 also reports the reporting media frequencies among the 50 firms. Of
the different types of reporting media, 82% of the sample mentions reporting concerns can be done
via phone, 48% mention some type of online reporting portal, following which are email with 44%,
traditional postal mail with 36%, and fax with 16%. Only 2% mention that employees can report
by sending a text message.
Panel C of Table 2.2 reports the content related to investigation procedures, wrongdoer
disciplinary action, and anti-retaliation policy. In terms of the investigation procedures, 66% of
the sample has content mentioning the companies’ investigation procedures (33 of 50), 62% state
that witnesses should cooperate with investigations (31 of 50), 22% state that witnesses should not
provide misleading information during the investigation (11 of 50), and 12% state that there will
be punishment if witnesses provide misleading information (6 of 50). Only 12% of the sample
mentions that there will be corrective actions after investigation (6 of 50), 18% provide information
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related to an external investigation from government (9 of 50), and 52% of the sample states that
the company will maintain witnesses’ confidentiality during the investigation (26 of 50).
As to the content related to wrongdoers, 26% of the sample states that wrongdoers include
those who detect unethical behaviors but fail to report (13 of 50), 8% mention that wrongdoing
includes a manger’s failure to detect unethical behaviors (4 of 50), and 20% state that wrongdoing
includes mangers’ ignorance (10 of 50). Most of the sample provides some general statement
relating to punishment of wrongdoers (45 of 50, 90%). In terms of the types of punishment, 84%
specifically state that wrongdoers will be punished by termination of job (42 of 50), 34% mention
some sort of legal punishment (17 of 50), and only 8% mention monetary punishment (4 of 50).
Another important section of the reporting policy is the anti-retaliation policy. Of the
sample, 96% has some general statement stating that no retaliation is allowed (48 of 50), 82%
require good faith reporting as a condition of a no retaliation policy (41 of 50), 18% have a detailed
definition of what constitutes good faith (9 of 50), 8% state that the company will investigate the
incident if there is retaliation against witnesses (4 of 50), 20% of the sample has a list of retaliation
examples (10 of 50), 36% mention that there will be punishment against retaliation behaviors (18
of 50), 30% specifically mention that retaliation will be punished by termination (15 of 50), and
only 8% mention that retaliation will be punished by legal action (4 of 50).
[Insert Table 2.2 Here]
Table 2.3 reports the number of words occurring in each content characteristic. As reported
in Panel A of Table 2.3, the executive letter accounts for 9.8% of the policy content, the importance
of the policy accounts for 4%, and comprehension aid takes 28.8% of the policy content. Of the
total words, 3.4% describe who is covered by the policy, 12.8% describe the responsibility of the
employee to report wrongdoing, 21.7% describe where to report, and 4.4% of the words are used
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in describing the reporting media format. Investigation procedures take about 5.2% of the words,
wrongdoer disciplinary action takes about 3.4%, and the anti-retaliation policy takes about 6.4%.
Panel B of Table 2.3 provides details of the percentage within each of the content categories.
Within the importance of the policy category, 35.5% of the words are used to describe that
employees should read and understand the policy, and 35.6% of the words are used to discuss the
policy training information. Within the comprehensive aid category, Q/A accounts for 84% of the
words, with Questions accounting for 30.1%, and Answers accounting for 53.9% of the words.
Within who is covered by the policy, 32.3% of the words describe employees, 22.6% describe the
board of directors, 16.8% describe the entire group, and 16.1% describe business partners. In terms
of the content describing responsibilities, words used for the employees’ responsibility account for
77.1%, and the words used for mangers responsibility account for 22.9%. Within employees’
responsibilities, most of the words are used in discussing the responsibility of asking questions
(18.2%) and the responsibility of reporting concerns (49.7%). As to where to report, most of the
words are used in describing the hotlines (25%), following that are compliance/ethics office
(16.5%), supervisors (15.6%) and legal division (9.9%). The four most discussed reporting media
formats are phone (34.4%), website (21.6%), mail (19.9%), and email (15.8%).
In terms of investigative procedures, the word usage focuses on discussing the general
investigation procedures (32.1%), confidentiality and anonymity (25%), witness cooperation
(16.9%), and external investigation (13.1%). As to the content related to wrongdoers, the mention
of disciplinary action accounts for 36.6% of the words, termination of jobs accounts for 31.8%,
and legal punishment accounts for 14.5%. As for the anti-retaliation policy content, 46.6% of the
words are used in the general statement of no retaliation allowed, and 26.6% of the words are
related to reporting with good faith.
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[Insert Table 2.3 Here]
The Linguistic Characteristics of Internal Whistleblowing Policy
Table 2.4 presents the usage of different types of linguistic characteristics in companies’
whistleblowing policies. As shown in Panel A, pronouns account for 4.8% of all the words in the
policy, uncertainty words account for 0.7%, and linguistic tone accounts for 1.6%. Panel B
provides the detailed linguistic features within pronouns and linguistic tone. As to pronouns, 46.8%
of the pronouns are first-person pronouns, 42.7% are second-person pronouns, and 10.5% are
third-person pronouns. Within the first-person pronouns, 29.1% are in singular format, and 17.8%
are in plural format. Within the third-person pronouns, 3.4% are in singular format, and 7.1% are
in plural format. In addition, 84.1% of the linguistic tone is positive tone, while 15.9% is negative
tone.
[Insert Table 2.4 Here]
The Overlap within Content Characteristics
Table 2.5 presents the C-Coefficient between “executives’ opening letter” and the rest of
the content characteristics. This helps describe what executives discuss in their opening letters.
The c-coefficient varies between 0 (codes do not co-occur) and 1 (two codes always occur
together). It shows that “executives’ opening letter” has a 0.41 C-Coefficient with “importance of
the policy”, a 0.41 C-Coefficient with “what is the responsibility”, a 0.39 C-Coefficient with
“Where to report”, a 0.14 C-Coefficient with “Anti-retaliation policy”, and a 0.13 C-Coefficient
with “Who is covered by the policy”. Executives opening letters have limited overlap with
“Comprehension aid”, “investigation procedures” and “wrongdoer disciplinary action”. This
suggests that companies use executives’ opening letters mostly to emphasize the importance of the
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policy, the responsibilities, and where to report. The opening letters have limited discussions of
investigative procedures and disciplinary actions against wrongdoers.
[Insert Table 2.5 Here]
Table 2.6 summarizes the C-Coefficient between “Q/A” and the rest of the content
characteristics. The C-Coefficient between “Q/A” and “what is the responsibility” is 0.39, and the
C-Coefficient between “Q/A” and “who is covered by the policy” is 0.13. Additionally, CCoefficient between “Q/A” and “Where to report” is 0.39. There is limited overlap between “Q/A”
and other content characteristics.
[Insert Table 2.6 Here]
The Overlap between Content Characteristics and Linguistic Characteristics
Table 2.7 lists the overlap between content characteristics and linguistic characteristics.
Panel A and Figure 2.1 list the overlap between types of pronouns and content characteristics. It
suggests that there is great variation in terms of the percentage of different types of pronouns used
in different content areas. Companies seem to use more first-person pronouns when describing the
executive letter, importance of the policy, comprehension aid, and who is covered by the policy.
Companies start to use more second-person pronouns and less first-person pronouns when they
start to describe the responsibility, where to report, and what constitutes the report media. Third
person pronoun usage is relatively consistent across different content.
Panel B and Figure 2.2 list the overlap between different content and uncertainty words
and linguistic tone. It indicates that when companies are describing the wrongdoer’s disciplinary
actions, the usage of uncertainty words is the highest. For most of the content, the company uses
more positive tone than negative tone. As firms start to discuss the wrongdoers’ disciplinary
actions, there is an increase in the negative tone and a decrease in the positive tone.
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[Insert Table 2.7 Here]
[Insert Figure 2.1 Here]
[Insert Figure 2.2 Here]
Table 2.8 summarizes the usage of fictitious third person pronouns and generic third person
pronouns in Q/A sections. It suggests that most of the third person pronouns used in companies’
Q/A are in fictitious third person pronouns (86%), and only 14% of the total third person pronoun
Q/A are in generic third person pronouns.
[Insert Table 2.8 Here]

49

VI: SUMMARY, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH

This study takes an exploratory approach to investigate the content and linguistic
characteristics of companies’ internal reporting policies with a sample of 50 firms. Results indicate
that most firms specifically mention that employees need to read and understand the policy (78%),
and some firms also state that employees need to periodically certify their compliance with the
policy (32%). More than half of the firms have information related to policy training (30 of 50,
60%). Thus, the internal reporting policy is important to employees in terms of guiding them to
make the correct ethical decisions.
In terms of where to report, first of all, firms prefer employees to report their supervisors.
Results show that 66% of the firms implicitly mention that employees are encouraged to report to
their supervisors first, and the most common reporting channel is reporting to supervisors (48 of
50, 96%). In regards to the reporting media, phone is the most common media used to report
wrongdoing (41 of 50, 82%). As internet technology advances, reporting unethical behavior using
the internet is also very common. Results indicate that 48% of the sample has an online reporting
website, and 44% of the sample mentions that employees can report via Email.
Throughout companies’ internal reporting policies, most of the words are used to describe
the following content categories: where to report wrongdoing (21%) and employees’
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responsibilities (12.8%). Companies use relatively less words in describing the investigation
procedures (5.2%) and anti-retaliation policies (6.4%). This result is interesting because prior
research documents that the primary reason why people do not want to report misconduct is the
fear of reprisal (Wainberg and Perreault 2016). Providing such limited information on investigative
procedures and anti-retaliation policies may increase employees’ fear of reprisal.
Within companies’ internal reporting policies, all firms in the sample state that the internal
reporting policy applies to all employees, and only 8% of the sample specifically mention that
executives are also covered by the policy. This small percentage is worth noting because many
wrongful acts are committed by executive level employees. To promote ethical conduct and
encourage witnesses’ reporting of unethical behaviors, it is important that employees feel that
executives are treated the same as everyone else in the company when it comes to unethical
behaviors.
In regard to the content related to everyone’s responsibility, most of the words are used to
describe employees’ responsibilities (77%), and a relatively small amount of words are used to
discuss managers’ responsibilities (23%). Several studies document that tone at the top is a crucial
determinant of ethical practices within organizations (e.g., Bannon et al. 2010; Berson et al. 2008;
Merchant 1990; Schaubroeck et al. 2012; Weber 2010). Limited discussion of managers’
responsibilities in companies’ internal reporting policies may influence employees’ perception of
the tone at the top.
The executive’s opening letter is the first thing employees read in the policy, and 78% (39
of 50) of the firms have an executive’s opening letter. Results show that most of the information
discussed in the letter relates to the importance of the policy, the employees’ responsibilities in
regard to reporting, and where to report. Opening letters have limited discussion of investigative
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procedures and disciplinary actions against wrongdoers. This is noteworthy as providing more
detailed discussion on the investigative procedures and disciplinary actions against wrongdoers in
the executive’s opening letter section may indicate that the company takes unethical conduct
seriously.
There is great variation in terms of the percentage of different types of pronouns used in
different content. Overall, companies seem to use more first-person pronouns than second-person
pronouns. Companies start to use more second-person pronouns and less first-person pronouns
when they start to describe the employees’ responsibility, where to report, and the reporting media.
Third person pronoun usage is relatively consistent across different content. Overall, the greater
usage of second-person pronouns in describing employees’ reporting responsibility, where to
report, and the reporting media may indicate that the policy is designed to give direct instructions
about what employees should do in these sections.
This study also suggests that the usage of uncertainty words seems to be the highest when
companies are describing the wrongdoer’s disciplinary actions. This could potentially make
employees doubt the seriousness of the company’s attitude towards unethical behaviors, because
employees may be uncertain about whether wrongdoers will actually be punished or not.
Throughout the policy, there is more positive linguistic tone usage than negative linguistic
tone usage. However, as firms start to discuss the disciplinary actions against wrongdoers, there is
an increase in negative tone and a decrease in positive tone. It is intuitive as more negative words
may be used when the company is talking about the punishments for wrongdoers.
In summary, this exploratory content analysis identifies many interesting patterns of
companies’ internal whistleblowing policy. However, a limitation of this study, and all qualitative
studies, is that results in this study are not tested empirically. Notwithstanding the limitation, this
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study documents several trends that future studies could investigate. First, companies use a lot of
words in the Q/A section. Also, there are variations in the usage of pronouns across reporting
policies. Experimental research could investigate whether different types of pronouns used in the
Q/A section might influence employees’ reporting intentions.
Second, the content and linguistic characteristics identified in this study could also
potentially provide an index to measure the quality of companies’ internal reporting policies. By
taking an archival approach, it would be instructive to investigate whether there are any
correlations between the quality of companies’ internal reporting policies and the quality of their
financial statements.
Third, one additional limitation of this study is that it only explores the content of the
policies of the 50 largest U.S. companies by stock market capitalization as of March 31, 2016. It
is possible the variation in content may be limited by only selecting the top 50 firms. Future
research could extend this study by investigating the bottom 50 firms, and compare whether there
are systematic content and linguistic differences between the top 50 firms and the bottom 50 firms.
Fourth, this study only investigates three linguistic features: pronouns, uncertainty words,
and linguistic tone. Other linguistic features (e.g., readability, passive or active voice) may also
provide valuable insights for internal reporting policy effectiveness. Senay et al. (2015)
documented that passive voice, as compared with active voice, may shift people’s attention away
from themselves and to the task they are assigned to (e.g., ‘It will be done’ vs. ‘I will do it’). Thus,
an effective internal reporting policy may involve strategically designing the use of passive voice
and active voice. Future research could investigate such linguistic variables to explore firms’
internal reporting policies.
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Finally, it is likely that different industries may have unique content or linguistic features
in their internal reporting policies. Additionally, the content and linguistic characteristics may have
changed over time, perhaps before or after significant events (e.g., SOX). It would be interesting
to explore the content and linguistic features of the internal reporting policy across different
industries and over time.
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Part Three: Using Pronouns Effectively in an Organization’s Internal Whistleblowing Policy

I. INTRODUCTION
Public companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Nasdaq Stock
Market (NASDAQ) must have a publicly available code of business ethics (NYSE 2009;
NASDAQ 2016). Companies’ codes of ethics should include procedures to promote internal
reporting of unethical behaviors (SEC 2003). A survey conducted by KPMG finds that 85 percent
of employees in the United States receive some form of communication and training specific to
their companies’ code of conduct, and around 86 percent of these communications are formal
training (KPMG 2013). Although codes of ethics are widely used by public firms to communicate
ethical issues with employees, there is no conclusive evidence of the effectiveness of codes of
ethics in encouraging desired employee behaviors (Kaptein and Schwartz 2008).
One of the key issues for a code of ethics’ success is effective communication (Stevens
2008). Language is a key componenet of effective communication. Employees can recognize the
value assigned by the corporation to ethical issues through the language the company uses
(Bethoux et al. 2007; Logsdon and Wood 2005). The current study examines one common, yet
underexplored, factor: the use of pronouns in corporate internal whistleblowing polices. Different
types of pronouns reflect different emotional states, personality, and other features of social
relationships (Chung and Pennebaker 2007; Pennebaker et al. 2007). First person pronouns
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include: I, me, mine, and my. Second person pronouns include: you, your, and yours. Third person
pronouns include: he, she, him, her, his, and hers. This study investigates how the use and
placement of first or third-person pronouns in the whistleblowing policy within a company’s code
of ethics affects employees’ whistleblowing intentions.
This study breaks the internal whistleblowing policy into two parts: the Reporting Policy
(the description of employees’ responsibility to report and where to report) and the Anti-retaliation
Policy (the description of protections against retaliation). It employs a 2 x 2 between-subjects
design by manipulating the type of pronouns used in the Reporting Policy (first-person pronoun
reporting policy or third-person pronoun reporting policy) and the type of pronouns used in the
Anti-retaliation Policy (first-person pronoun anti-retaliation policy or third-person pronoun antiretaliation policy). This study predicts that the effectiveness of first-person pronouns in
encouraging whistleblowing is contingent upon policy content. Results show that using firstperson pronouns encourages whistleblowing when they are used in the Reporting Policy. However,
the type of pronouns used in the Anti-retaliation Policy has no significant influence on employees’
reporting intentions. Additionally, employees’ perceptions of the vividness of the policy fully
mediates the first-person Reporting Policy’s effect on employees’ reporting intentions. In other
words, the first-person pronoun is effective in influencing reporting behavior because it can change
the vividness of the Reporting Policy’s message. Employees’ perceptions of the vividness of the
policy include: how precise the policy is, how clear the policy is, how specific the policy is, and
do they feel the policy is applicable to them.
This study offers several contributions to the literature. First, this is the first study
investigating the effects of pronoun usage in firms’ internal whistleblowing policies on employees’
whistleblowing intentions. Thus, it extends the accounting literature by incorporating relevant
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findings from the linguistic literature to improve our understanding of how companies can
communicate more effectively with employees. Second, the results have implications for
companies who have internal whistleblowing procedures intended to encourage internal reporting.
Our results indicate that the language used in these whistleblowing policies, specifically the use of
pronouns, may interact with policy content to influence employees’ reporting intentions. This
study provides evidence that can assist companies in identifying the whistleblowing policy
language that is most effective in encouraging internal reporting. Third, the results of this study
imply that even if companies have the same reporting procedures and policy content, variation in
the type of language used can lead to differences in employees’ reporting intentions. This
highlights a potential issue in existing regulation that ignores the specific presentation of
information. For example, Section 406 of SOX requires public companies to disclose whether they
have adopted a corporate code of business ethics that should include procedures for reporting
ethical violations. However, the SEC does not provide specific guidance as to how such procedures
should be presented.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. The next section includes background
information, theory, and hypotheses development. Section III provides the methodology,
participants, design, experimental task, independent variables, and dependent variables. Section
IV provides the results and Section V provides a summary of the study, implications, limitations,
and suggestions for future research.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT

Internal Whistleblowing Policies and Corporate Codes of Ethics
Starting with the collapse of Enron in 2001, a series of accounting scandals significantly
hurt investors’ confidence in stock market. To restore investors’ confidence in the wake of a
number of well-publicized U.S. public company failures, a series of regulations was implemented.
Among them, Section 406 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires public companies to
disclose the existence of a code of ethics that provides guidance to employees when facing ethical
issues (SEC 2003). Following SOX, NYSE and NASDAQ began to require companies listed on
their exchanges to adopt a code of business conduct for all employees, make the code publicly
available, and disclose it in their annual report (NYSE 2009; NASDAQ 2016). By definition, the
code of ethics should include written standards to promote honest and ethical conduct and provide
channels for employees to report wrongdoing to an appropriate person or persons (SEC 2003). In
other words, public firms’ codes of ethics should include a description of whistleblowing
procedures.
Firms expend much effort in an attempt to communicate their codes of ethics with
employees. A survey conducted by KPMG finds that 85 percent of employees in United States
receive some form of communication and training on their companies’ code of conduct, and around
86 percent of these communications are related to formal training (KPMG 2013). Many firms
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specifically state in their code of ethics that reading and learning the code of ethics is the first thing
new employees need to do. For example, American Express’ code of ethics specifically states that
employees need to confirm in writing or electronically that they have read and understand the
company’s code of ethics (American Express 2016). Although companies are increasingly paying
attention to the promotion of codes of ethics, the effectiveness of these codes in promoting desired
behaviors is not conclusive (Kaptein and Schwartz 2008). Vandekerckhove and Lewis (2012)
document an urgent need to better understand the design and implementation of effective internal
whistleblowing policies/procedures. Stevens (2008) argues that one of the key issues in the success
of codes of ethics is effective communication.
Use of Pronouns in Internal Whistleblowing Policies
One common practice in companies’ internal whistleblowing policies is the use of
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) or Question and Answer (Q/A) formatting. These formats are
used as comprehension aids in explaining key features of the policy (Erwin 2011). With these
formats, companies list selected specific questions that employees may have when facing unethical
conduct and provide answers for these questions. The use of pronouns in companies’
whistleblowing FAQ or Q/A sections varies. Some firms describe their whistleblowing policy
using first or second person pronouns (e.g., we, you, ours, or yours). For example, the following
information is an excerpt from Walmart’s whistleblowing policy, which uses first and second
person pronouns (emphasis added):
Q: My manager told me to markdown several items to zero but leave them on the
shelves to sell because it will “help our inventory.” Is this acceptable?
A: No. The manipulation of markdowns is not only dishonest, but it also could affect the
store’s profitability. If you’re being instructed to do this, report it to Global Ethics
immediately. (Walmart 2016, 23).
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Other companies use third-person pronouns (e.g., him, she, it, his, her or they) to describe
their whistleblowing policies. For instance, the following is an excerpt from American Express’s
whistleblowing policy, which uses third-person pronouns (emphasis added):
Q: Katerina’s leader tells her to delay sending an invoice to Vendors Payable until next
quarter. Katerina assumes her leader is trying to give their department some leeway to
meet next quarter’s quota. Should she follow her leader’s request?
A: No. All goods and services must be accounted for in the period incurred. Because
Katerina’s leader is asking her to create an inaccurate record, she should report the
situation immediately to her business unit’s Controller or Compliance Officer.
(American Express 2016, 18).
As exemplified in the above two examples, firms vary in the type of pronouns used to
describe the same topic. Prior linguistic studies indicate that pronouns are the most common
category of function word used in the English language. Pronoun usage can reflect emotional
states, personality, and other features of social relationships (Chung and Pennebaker 2007;
Pennebaker et al. 2007). The use of different types of pronouns indicates to whom attention should
be given. Specifically, use of third-person pronouns (e.g., he/she, they) indicates that attention is
on others, while the use of first-person pronouns (e.g., I, we) highlights that attention is on
ourselves as distinct entities (Zimmerman et al. 2013).
Considering the importance of effective communication to the success of codes of ethics
and that language plays such a critical role in effective communication, it is important to explore
how the use of different types of pronouns influences the effectiveness of internal whistleblowing
policies.
Language Vividness and First-Person Pronouns
Vivid language refers to language that “excite[s] the imagination to the extent that it is (1)
emotionally interesting, (2) concrete and imagery-provoking and (3) proximate in a sensory,
temporal, or spatial way’’ (Nisbett and Ross 1980, 45). Based on this definition, using first-person
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pronouns in the company’s Q/A section to describe the employees’ responsibility to report
observed wrongdoing, where to report, and protection from retaliation is more vivid than using
third-person pronouns. This is because first-person pronouns are more imagery-provoking and are
more likely to cause emotional responses (Zimmerman et al. 2013).
One of the approaches that prior experimental studies use to manipulate language vividness
is case-history information versus other forms of presentation (Taylor and Thompson 1982). This
is done by presenting information either in the format of a single case study or in the format of
base rate information (Hamill et al. 1980). A single case study is more vivid than base rate
information because it is more concrete and emotionally stimulating (Nisbett and Ross 1980).
Consistent with this approach, describing the internal whistleblowing policy using first-person
pronouns lets the reader assume that he/she is the actual person experiencing the specific case
scenario and consequently leads to greater emotional response. As documented by Seiha et al.
(2011), when the information format is shifted from the first-person perspective to the third-person
perspective, it reduces the vividness of spontaneous memories for the participants. Thus,
describing the internal whistleblowing policy using first-person pronouns is more vivid than if
third-person pronouns are used.
Language Vividness and Information Persuasion
Language vividness may also affect the persuasiveness of information. Nisbett and Ross
(1980) argue that vividly presented information enhances memory and persuasion. However,
empirical evidence provides conflicting evidence regarding vividness and information
persuasiveness. Some studies show that vivid language increases the persuasiveness of information
(e.g., Collins et al. 1988; Paivio 1969). Other studies do not find a relation between vividness and
persuasion (e.g., Werner and Latane 1976). Frey and Eagly (1993) argue that vividness can also
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undermine message processing if the vivid presentation involves elaborate imagery that is
irrelevant to the message itself. Smith and Shaffer (2000) argue that vividness can undermine or
enhance message processing depending on vividness congruency. Vividness congruency means
“the extent to which the vivid elements of a message are congruent with the theme of the message
itself” (Smith and Shaffer 2000, 769).
In the corporate internal whistleblowing policy context, the use of first-person pronouns
increases language vividness and the readers’ emotional reaction. Whether this language vividness
encourages employees’ reporting intentions or not may depend on the content of the policy.
Specifically, as discussed earlier, corporate internal whistleblowing policies can consist of a
Reporting Policy, which includes a description of employees’ reporting responsibility and
describes reporting channels, and/or an Anti-retaliation Policy, which describes the company’s
policy against retaliation against employees who report wrongdoing. For the Reporting Policy
content, first-person pronouns may be more effective in encouraging employees to report than
third-person pronouns, because first-person pronouns cause employees to have a stronger
emotional reaction driven by feelings that he/she is the actual person asking the questions and
receiving the answers.
For the Anti-retaliation Policy, the effectiveness of first-person pronouns in encouraging
employees to report wrongdoing is less clear. First-person pronouns may encourage reporting
intentions as the reader may feel that he/she is the person asking the question of whether he/she
will be protected from retaliation and being told directly that the company doesn’t tolerate
retaliation. In contrast, first-person pronouns may decrease reporting intentions because vivid
descriptions of potential retaliation actions may activate implicit threats of reprisal causing the risk
of retaliation to become more salient. This increased salience of risk may cause the reader feel
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more strongly that they will face these potential retaliation threats than if less vivid language in
the form of third-person pronouns is used. Feelings of increased retaliation risk are incongruent
with the message that protection is being offered by the company (Wainberg and Perreault 2016).
As discussed previously, vividness can undermine message processing if it is incongruent with the
theme of the message. Thus, using first-person pronouns to describe the anti-retaliation policy
could negatively affect employees’ reporting intentions.
Consistent with the premise that increased vividness can lead to unanticipated negative
effects. Wainberg and Perreault (2016) conduct an experiment where they vary the existence of an
anti-retaliation policy. They find that the presence of an anti-retaliation policy increases the
salience of retaliatory threats and lowers witnesses’ reporting intentions. Their finding that
presenting anti-retaliation policy information may adversely affect whistleblowing intentions is
interesting. A logical follow-up question is what a company should do with its internal
whistleblowing policy in regard to presenting anti-retaliation information in a way that doesn’t
impede the willingness of employees to report wrongdoing. This study addresses one potential
factor that addresses this question. Specifically, it investigates the effect of pronoun type on
employee responses to an anti-retaliation policy.
In summary, the effectiveness of the use of first-person pronouns in encouraging
whistleblowing intentions is contingent upon the specific policy content. First-person pronouns
should be effective in encouraging employee reporting when they are used in the Reporting Policy
descriptions of employees’ reporting responsibility and reporting channels. However, in the Antiretaliation Policy, using first-person pronouns may decrease employees’ reporting intentions due
to the increased salience of the retaliation words. Based on the above discussion, the following
hypotheses are generated:
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H1: Employees’ reporting intentions are higher when the Reporting Policy uses
first-person pronouns than when it uses third-person pronouns.
H2: Employees’ reporting intentions are lower when the Anti-retaliation Policy uses
first-person pronouns than when it uses third-person pronouns.
Interaction between Reporting Policy Pronouns and Anti-Retaliation Policy Pronouns
Based on the previous discussion, pronoun type is expected to interact with the information
content of the policy. As such, the use of first-person pronouns may either increase or decrease
employees reporting intentions contingent upon the content of the policy where these pronouns
are used. Another empirical question worth exploring is whether the types of pronouns in the
Reporting Policy interact with the types of pronouns in the Anti-retaliation Policy. In other words,
the question arises as to whether the predicted effectiveness of a first-person reporting policy is
affected by the pronoun usage in the Anti-retaliation Policy.
In combination, Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 suggest that when both the Reporting
Policy and the Anti-retaliation Policy are included in the internal whistleblowing policy, the most
effective combination of pronoun use in encouraging reporting intentions will be achieved when
the Reporting Policy is in first-person and the Anti-retaliation Policy is in third-person. Conversely,
one would expect that the least effective combination of pronoun use would occur when the
Reporting Policy is in third-person and the Anti-retaliation Policy is in first-person. This leads to
my third hypothesis:
H3a: Employees’ reporting intentions are the highest when the Reporting Policy
uses first-person pronouns and the Anti-retaliation Policy uses third-person
pronouns.
H3b: Employees’ reporting intentions are the lowest when the Reporting Policy uses
third-person pronouns and the Anti-retaliation Policy uses first-person pronouns.
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However, it is less clear what will occur with other combinations of pronoun type and
policy content. When first-person pronouns are used in both the Reporting Policy and the Antiretaliation Policy, the language will be more vivid than if first-person pronouns are used in only
one of the policies. This stronger language vividness may increase reporting intentions if the
employee focuses on the Reporting Policy or decrease reporting intentions if the employee focuses
on the Anti-retaliation Policy. When third-person pronouns are used in both the Reporting Policy
and the Anti-retaliation Policy, the language will be less vivid than if third-person pronouns are
used in one of the policies. This weaker language vividness may decrease reporting intentions if
the employee focuses on the Reporting Policy or increase reporting intentions if the employee
focuses on the Anti-retaliation Policy. Due to the lack of a clear directional prediction in these
cases, I propose the following research questions:
RQ1: How will whistleblowing likelihood be affected if both the Reporting Policy
and the Anti-retaliation Policy are in first person?
RQ2: How will whistleblowing likelihood be affected if both the Reporting Policy
and the Anti-retaliation Policy are in third person?

Risk Aversion and Vividness of Anti-Retaliation Policy
People have different attitudes toward things involving risk and uncertainty. Risk aversion
is defined as the tendency to avoid uncertainties and risks (Blais and Weber 2006), and it is
considered the central theoretical concept in economics (Blais and Weber 2006). Reporting other
employees’ wrongdoing is considered risky, and the primary reason why people do not want to
report misconduct is the fear of reprisal (Wainberg and Perreault 2016). People who are low in
risk aversion are less likely to be influenced by the risk of retaliation than people who are high in
risk aversion. Thus, the increased salience of potential retaliation threats due to the use of a first-
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person anti-retaliation policy is less likely to influence risk seeking employees’ reporting
intentions. Based on the above discussion, I propose the following hypothesis:
H4: The effect of the first-person pronoun anti-retaliation policy is stronger for
employees with high risk aversion than for employees with low risk aversion.
III. METHOD
Design and Participants
This study employs a 2 x 2 between-subjects design by manipulating the type of pronouns
used in a corporate ethical violation Reporting Policy (first-person reporting policy or third-person
reporting policy) and the type of pronouns used in the corporate Anti-retaliation Policy (firstperson anti-retaliation policy or third-person anti-retaliation policy). This experimental design
generates a total of four experimental treatments (see Table 6). Students from a major southeastern
university were recruited as voluntary participants in the study and participants were randomly
assigned to one of the four treatment conditions.4
Tasks and Procedures
Participants were presented with a short case involving a hypothetical manufacturing
company called XOTLE, Inc. (XOTLE). Background information indicates that the company’s
operating results over the past few years are steady and below industry average. A fraudulent act
related to revenue recognition was noticed by an employee named Rowan Geoffrey, who is in
charge of preparing some accounting entries and related financial reports. Rowan finds that his
boss, Gilbert Elias, (the CFO) engaged in fraudulent financial reporting. After reading the
background information, participants were presented with XOTLE’s internal whistleblowing
policy. The policy is organized via “Q/A” format. The first part of the policy is the Reporting

4

Graduate students are used by many recent studies to examine reporting intentions for questionable acts (Ayers and
Kaplan 2005; Kaplan and Schultz 2007; Kaplan, Pope, and Samuels 2010).
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Policy. The Reporting Policy is in “Q/A” format. It describes the responsibility of XOTLE
employees to report wrongdoing and the reporting channel. The reporting channel is an anonymous
hotline administered by the internal auditors of XOTLE, Inc. The hotline is available 24 hours a
day and 365 days a year. The second part of the policy is the anti-retaliation policy. The Antiretaliation Policy is also in “Q/A” format. It describes the company’s anti-retaliation policy. The
use of pronouns in each section of the company’s internal whistleblowing policy varies across
treatments as described above.
After reading the company’s whistleblowing policy, participants were asked to indicate 1)
Rowan’s likelihood of reporting the wrongdoing, and 2) their likelihood of reporting assuming
they were in Rowan’s position. Participants then answer a series of follow-up and demographic
questions (see Appendix C).
Independent Variables
Reporting Policy Pronoun Type
The first independent variable is the type of pronouns used in the company’s reporting
policy of ethical violations. It is manipulated at two levels (first-person pronouns vs. third-person
pronouns). Participants who are assigned to the first-person reporting policy group receive the
following reporting policy:
Q: If I detect unethical/fraudulent acts, what is my responsibility to speak up? How
should I raise the concern?
A: You must speak up promptly if there is any reason to suspect that anyone in the
company has violated company policies or local laws. Your report will be taken seriously
and investigated appropriately. It is better to report a suspicion that turns out not to be an
issue than to ignore a possible violation of the law or Company policy.
To comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, XOTLE, Inc. maintains an anonymous
reporting hotline for whistle blowers. You are encouraged to call the hotline. The hotline
is administered by the internal auditors of XOTLE, Inc. The hotline is available 24 hours
a day and 365 days a year. The telephone calls made to the hotline are to be reported to
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the audit committee for further investigation. The identity and any information about
youwill be kept strictly confidential.
Participants who are assigned to the third-person reporting policy group face the same reporting
policy as presented above except that the first-person pronouns are replaced with third-person
pronouns.
Q: If an employee detects unethical/fraudulent acts, what is his/her responsibility to speak
up? How should he/she raise the concern?
A: He/she must speak up promptly if there is any reason to suspect that anyone in the
company has violated company policies or local laws. His/Her report will be taken
seriously and investigated appropriately. It is better to report a suspicion that turns out not
to be an issue than to ignore a possible violation of the law or Company policy.
To comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, XOTLE, Inc. maintains an anonymous
reporting hotline for whistle blowers. He/She is encouraged to call the hotline. The
hotline is administered by the internal auditors of XOTLE, Inc. The hotline is available
24 hours a day and 365 days a year. The telephone calls made to the hotline are to be
reported to the audit committee for further investigation. The identity and any
information about him/her will be kept strictly confidential.
Anti-Retaliation Policy Pronoun Type
The second independent variable is the type of pronouns used in the company’s antiretaliation policy. It is also manipulated at two levels (first-person pronouns vs. third-person
pronouns). Participants who are assigned to the first-person anti-retaliation policy group receive
the following reporting policy:
Q: If I report a fraud, will I be protected from retaliation?
A: All responses are kept anonymous. You will not be subject to intimidation or
retaliation. This includes being left out, managerial or coworker abuse, threatening
behavior, harassment, loss of job or promotion, or any other professional, personal, or
financial form of retaliation both now and in the future.
If you believe that you are being retaliated against, you should report such conduct
immediately to the Human Resources Department. Any individual who unlawfully
discriminates or retaliates against you as a result of the protected actions may be subject
to disciplinary action, up to and including immediate termination.
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Participants who are assigned to the third-person anti-retaliation policy group receive the same
anti-retaliation policy as presented above except that the first-person pronouns are replaced with
third-person pronouns.
Q: If an employee reports a fraud, will he/she be protected from retaliation?
A: All responses are kept anonymous. He/She will not be subject to intimidation or
retaliation. This includes being left out, managerial or coworker abuse, threatening
behavior, harassment, loss of job or promotion, or any other professional, personal, or
financial form of retaliation both now and in the future.
If he/she believes that he/she is being retaliated against, he/she should report such
conduct immediately to the Human Resources Department. Any individual who
unlawfully discriminates or retaliates against him/her as a result of the protected actions
may be subject to disciplinary action, up to and including immediate termination.
Dependent Variables
The primary dependent variable in this study is measured by asking the participants’ the
following two questions:
1. Given this situation, how likely is it that someone in Rowan’s position would report
the CFO’s fraudulent act?
2. .Now imagine you are facing this situation. How likely is it that you would report the
CFO’s fraudulent act?”
Participants respond on a scale from 0 (definitely would not report) to 10 (definitely would report).
Follow-up Questions and Demographic Information
Following the dependent variables assessment, the questionnaire includes measurement of
risk aversion, vividness of the whistleblowing policy, perceptions of the fraudulent act, and
demographic information. In this study, participants’ risk aversion is measured with a six-item
scale based on the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking attitude developed by Weber et al. (2002).5 Item
1, 3, and 5 belong to the domain of financial gambling risk. Item 2, 4, and 6 belong to the domain

5 Prior research suggests that psychological test results based on survey questions are a reliable and valid approach
of measuring individuals’ risk aversion (Ekelund et al. 2005).
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of financial investment risk. These six items are assessed on a 7-point Likert-type scale. The
Domain-Specific Risk-Taking scale is a stable measurement of risk taking attitude used in many
studies (Zhang et al. 2011; Hu and Xie 2012; Zhang et al. 2016).
Vividness of the whistleblowing policy is measured with a four-item scale based on Kelly
et al. (1989) and Nagaraj (2007) (see Appendix C). Similar to prior research (e.g., Kaplan et al.
2009; Zhang et al. 2013; Brink et al. 2013), the instrument also includes several questions to that
assess participant perceptions the fraudulent act, such as the perceived vividness of the policy, the
seriousness of the fraud, the responsibility to report, and the risk of retaliation. At the end of the
questionnaire, e ants’ demographic information, such as gender, age, and education are collected
for further analysis (see Appendix C for a complete list of questions included in the research
instrument).6

6 The instrument does not include direct questions to check the manipulation of first vs. third-person pronouns, as
prior research indicates that the effect of different types of pronouns in a narrative disclosure is subconscious
(Pennebaker 2011; Assay working). Thus, it would be confusing to ask participants about the type of pronouns in
the internal whistleblowing policy as they will not likely register this consciously. In the manipulations, the only
difference between treatment groups are the type of pronouns. All other features are held constant. Thus, a
systematic reporting intention difference between groups should indicate that the type of pronouns used influenced
participant decision making.
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IV. RESULTS

Post-Experiment Questions
A total of 163 participants completed the experimental survey. Participants’ demographic
information is summarized in Table 3.1. The average participant age was 28 and the average work
experience was 5.1 years. Approximately 48 percent of respondents were female, 52 percent were
male, 32 percent were undergraduate students, 68 percent were graduate students. Twenty-four
percent of the participants indicated they had discovered a person of greater authority engaged in
questionable behaviors. Twenty-three participants reported that English was not their first
language. Participants whose first language are not English may not be sensitive to the types of
pronouns used in a context. Thus, they are excluded from subsequent analyses. When included as
covariates, none of the above demographic variables were significant. Therefore, demographic
variables are not included as covariates in subsequent analyses.
Table 3.2 reports the descriptive statistics for whistleblowing intentions measurement, and
questions measuring participants’ perception of the wrongdoing. Results show that the mean firstperson reporting intention is 8.26, and the mean third-person reporting intention is 6.34. Table 3.2
also reports the descriptive statistics about participants’ perception of the seriousness of the
wrongdoing (mean 6.03), the personal cost of reporting (mean 4.21), the likelihood that there
would be negative repercussions (mean 3.87), the likelihood of hurting the promotion (mean 3.99),
the chance of being retaliated (mean 3.96), the responsibility to report (mean 6.41), the likelihood
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that the company will thoroughly investigate the case (mean 4.93), the company will correct the
wrongdoing (mean 4.94), and the level of disciplinary actions against wrongdoer (mean 5.39).
Table 3.3, Panel A reports the descriptive statistics and factor loading of language vividness
measurement and risk aversion measurement. Each of the four items measuring the language
vividness shows a minimum of 0.5 loading, and a strongly loading item is generally a 0.5 loading
or higher (Costello and Osborne 2005). As discussed earlier, our risk aversion measurement has
two domains: financial gambling risk domain and financial investment risk domain. As displayed
in Panel A, Table 3.3, each of the financial gambling risk domain items (the first, third, and fifth
item) enjoys a factor loading higher than 0.8, while each of the financial investment risk domain
(the second, fourth, and sixth item) has a factor loading lower than 0.34. Weber et al. (2002)
documented that the difference between these two domains is the level of control over the risk,
and financial gambling risk is less controllable than financial investment risk. In our study, the risk
involves the possibility of retaliation from the firm, which is difficult to control. Thus, I retain only
the financial gambling risk domain items (the first, third, and fifth item) for future analysis. Table
3.3, Panel B reports the measurement reliability of the language vividness and risk aversion. The
Cronbach’s α of the two constructs are above 0.7, indicating adequate reliability (Nunnally 1978).
Hypothesis Testing and Research Question Analysis
Table 3.4 reports the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) findings with reporting intentions as
the dependent variable7. H1 predicts reporting intentions will be higher when the Reporting Policy
is worded in first-person than when it is worded in third-person. Table 3.2, Panel A shows that the
reporting intention is higher when the company’s Reporting Policy is worded in first-person than

Dependent Variable: ‘‘How likely is it that you would report the CFO’s fraudulent act?’’ scaled using an 11-point
ascending scale (endpoints labeled ‘‘Extremely Unlikely’’ and ‘‘Extremely
Likely’’).
7
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when it is in third-person (8.57 versus 7.93) and the difference is significant (F = 3.87, p = 0.05).
Thus, H1 is supported.
H2 predicts that reporting intentions will be lower when the Anti-Retaliation Policy is
worded in first-person han when it is in third-person. The main effect of the Anti-Retaliation Policy
Pronouns is not significant (F = 0.21, p = 0.65). Thus, H2 is not supported. H3a predicts that
reporting intentions will be the highest when Reporting Policy is in first-person and the antiretaliation policy is in third-person. H3b predicts that the reporting intentions will be the lowest
when Reporting Policy is in third-person and the anti-retaliation policy is in first-person. The
results of a one-way ANOVA do not indicate that whistleblowing intention in one treatment is
significantly higher than other treatments (F = 1.59, p = 0.19). Thus, H3a and H3b are not
supported. RQ1 and RQ2 investigate whether the types of pronouns in Reporting Policy interact
with the types of pronouns in Anti-Retaliation Policy. As shown in Table 3.2 Panel A, there are
no significant interactions between the two independent variables (F = 0.74, p = 0.39).
H4 predicts that the effect of the first-person pronoun anti-retaliation policy is stronger for
employees with high risk aversion than for employees with low risk aversion. The median value
of the risk aversion variable is 3.0. The participants are classified as either low risk seeking or high
risk seeking base on a median split. The ANOVA analysis with Anti-Retaliation Policy Pronouns
and Risk Aversion as independent variables show that there is no significant interaction between
the two variables (F = 1.39, p = 0.24). Thus, H4 is not supported.
Supplemental Analyses
Vividness of the Policy Mediation
As discussed earlier, the post-experiment questionnaire includes several questions to
measure participants’ perception of the vividness of the whistleblowing policy. Participants are
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asked to rate how precise the policy is, how clear the policy is, how specific the policy is, and if
they feel the policy is applicable to them. The variation of the types of pronouns used in companies’
Reporting Policy may influence employees’ perception of the vividness of the policy and in turn
affect reporting intentions. In other words, the perceived vividness of the policy is predicted to
mediate the Reporting Policy pronouns’ effect on reporting intentions.
I use the PROCESS add-on in SPSS to examine the mediating effect (Hayes 2013). As
Figure 3.1 illustrates, the standardized regression coefficient between Reporting Policy Pronouns
and Language Vividness is statistically significant (Beta = -0.31, p < 0.05), as was the standardized
regression coefficient between Language Vividness and Reporting Intentions (Beta =0.55, p <
0.05). Reporting Policy Pronouns is significantly correlated with Reporting Intentions (Beta = 0.31, p < 0.05). The relationship between Reporting Policy Pronouns and Reporting Intentions is
diminished when the relationships between Reporting Policy Pronouns and Language Vividness
and between Language Vividness and Reporting Intentions are controlled (reduced from Beta =
-.31, p < 0.05 to Beta = -0.14, p = 0.41). The standardized indirect effect was (-0.31) (0.55) = 0.17. I test the significance of this indirect effect using normal theory tests in PROCESS. Results
show that the indirect effect is significant (Beta = -0.17, p = 0.01)8. Thus, Language Vividness
fully mediates the Reporting Policy Pronouns’ effect on Reporting Intentions.
[Insert Figure 3 here]

8

I also employ the Baron and Kenny (1986) approach to test the model. Results support that Language Vividness
fully mediates the Reporting Policy Pronouns’ effect on Reporting Intentions.
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V. CONCLUSIONS

Companies’ codes of ethics potentially play an important role in guiding employees
towards making the right decision when they encounter unethical behaviors. Firms exert effort to
communicate the code of ethics with employees. Often employees are required to be familiar with
the code, and may be required to undergo training specifically related to the code of ethics. Despite
these efforts, the effectiveness of codes of ethics in encouraging desired employee behaviors is not
conclusive (Kaptein and Schwartz 2008). One of the key issues for a code of ethics’ success is
effective communication (Stevens 2008). Pronouns plays an important role in effective
communication. The purpose of the present study is to examine whether different types of
pronouns used in the Reporting Policy and different types of pronouns used in the Anti-Retaliation
policy influence employees’ reporting intentions.
Results indicate that first-person pronouns encourage employee reporting intentions when
they are used in the Reporting Policy. However, the results do not provide evidence that AntiRetaliation policy pronoun type significantly affects reporting intentions. Mediation analysis
indicates that participants’ perceived vividness of the policy completely mediates the first-person
Reporting Policy’s effect on employees’ reporting intentions.
These results suggest that firms desiring to motivate employees should pay attention, not
only to the content of the ethics policy, but also to the linguistic vividness of the policy. Using
first-person pronouns in the Reporting Policy may improve the vividness of the policy, and
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ultimately influence employees’ reporting intentions. However, pronoun type in the AntiRetaliation Policy doesn’t seem to influence employees’ reporting intentions. As the Reporting
Policy is usually displayed before the Anti-Retaliation Policy, participants may be most influenced
by pronoun type in the Reporting Policy. Future research could test this potential order effect by
only including the Anti-Retaliation Policy in the experimental design.
Language plays an important role in effective communication of the internal reporting
policy. Future research can explore other language characteristics that help shape the most
effective internal reporting policy, such as readability, use of uncertainty words, etc.
This study has a number of limitations. First, this study uses an experimental approach with
limited information provided to participants in each case. Participants’ reports may be different in
“real life”. However, the hypotheses rely on the differences among treatments instead of absolute
levels. Thus, this limitation diminishes. Second, the internal reporting policy investigated in this
study only focuses on the Reporting Policy and the Anti-retaliation Policy. A full internal reporting
policy also includes investigative procedures, who is covered by the policy, etc. Third, there are
many types of fraudulent acts in practice, this study only examines one fraud case. Inferences from
this study may be limited.
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Figure 1 – Model of whistleblowing
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Table 1.1 - Summary of studies on characteristics of the whistleblower

CITATION
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INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

DEPENDENT
VARIABLES

Curtis and
Taylor
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Accounting
and the
Public
Interest
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Locus of control
and ethical style

whistleblowing
intentions

Dalton and
Radtke
(2013)

Journal of
Business
Ethics

2 by 1
betweensubjects design

116 MBA
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Machiavellianism
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intentions

Brink et al.
(2015a)
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Forensic and
Investigative
Accounting

2 by 1
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experiment
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accounting
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Personality traits,
ethical position,
and wrongdoing
materiality

whistleblowing
intentions

2 by 2
betweensubjects design

118 MBA
students

Gender and
reporting channel

whistleblowing
intentions

Journal of
Kaplan et al.
Business
(2009)
Ethics
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KEY RESULTS
Auditors with an internal
locus of control and
auditors who exhibit a
judging ethical style are
more likely to report.
Machiavellianism is
negatively related to
whistle-blowing.
There is a positive relation
between the presence of
higher levels of the alpha
and beta meta-traits and
whistle-blowing behaviors;
individuals with idealistic
ethical position are more
likely to report than
individuals with relativistic
ethical position.
They find that female
participants’ reporting
intentions are higher than
for male participants only
under the anonymous
reporting channel
condition.

Liyanarachc
hi and Adler
(2011)

Australian
Accounting
Review

Erkmen et
al. (2014)

Journal of
Accounting
&
Organization
al Change

Quisiexperiment

2000
Australian
accountants

Age and Gender

Survey

116
accounting
professionals

Age and types of
wrongdoing
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Among early career
accountants, male
accountants are more
likely than female
accountants to blow the
whistle; when accountants
are at the age group of 45
or above, female
whistleblowing
accountants’ reporting
intentions
intention in this age group
tends to decline as the
retaliation threat increases.
In contrast, the change in
retaliation threat has little
impact on male
accountants’ reporting
intention.
Female accounting
professionals are more
likely to blow the whistle
than male accounting
professionals when the
fraud involves fake
whistleblowing invoices, and older
intentions
accounting professionals
are more likely to blow the
whistle than younger
professionals when the
fraud involves
misclassification of sales
and profits.

Table 1.2 - Summary of Studies on characteristics of the report recipient
CITATION JOURNAL

Kaplan et
al. (2010)

Behavioral
Research in
Accounting

Kaplan et
al. (2011)

Auditing: A
Journal of
Practice &
Theory

RESEARCH
METHOD

SAMPLE

INDEPENDENT DEPENDENT
VARIABLES
VARIABLES

2 by 2 between- 96 MBA
subjects design students

Social
confrontation
and recipient
power status

Whistleblowing
intentions

2 by 2 by 2
betweensubjects design

207 MBA
students

Auditor inquiry,
reporting
channel

Whistleblowing
intentions

Whistleblowing
intentions

Whistleblowing
intentions

Kaplan and
Schultz
(2007)

Journal of
Business
Ethics

2 by 2 by 3
mixed design

90 MBA
students

Anonymous
reporting
channel,
different fraud
cases

Curtis and
Taylor
(2009)

Accounting
and the
Public
Interest

within-subjects
scenario-based
survey

122 incharge
level
auditors

Identity
disclosure, locus
of control and
ethical style

93

KEY RESULTS
The witness’ reporting
intentions to the supervisor’s
supervisor are stronger than
to an internal auditor when
there is unsuccessful social
confrontation with the
supervisor.
Participants’ whistleblowing
intentions to an inquiring
auditor are stronger than their
whistleblowing intentions to
a non-inquiring auditor and
their whistleblowing
intention to an internal
auditor are stronger than their
intentions to an external
auditor.
The existence of an
anonymous channel does
reduce the likelihood of
reporting to non-anonymous
channels.
Reporting intention is
significantly lower under a
disclosed identity format, and
there was no significant
difference in reporting
intention between

anonymous and protected
identity formats.

Kaplan et
al. (2012)

Advances in
Accounting,
2×2×2 repeated
incorporating
measures
Advances in
design
International
Accounting

Kaplan et
al. (2009)

Auditing: A
Journal of
Practice &
Theory

Zhang et
al. (2013)

Auditing: A
Journal of
Practice &
Theory

81 MBA
students

Reporting
channel,
retaliation to the
previous
whistleblower,
and transgressor
repercussions

2 by 1 between- 37 MBA
subjects design students

Anonymous
Hotline
Administrator

2 by 2 between- 130 MBA
subjects design students

Anonymous
Hotline
Administrator,
Previous
Whistleblowing
Outcomes

94

Witnesses’ reporting
intention to anonymous
channel is higher than nonWhistleblowing
anonymous channel only
intentions
when previous
whistleblowing outcome is
negative.
Reporting intentions to the
internal hotline are
Whistleblowing
significantly higher
intentions
compared to the external
hotline.
Participants’ reporting
intentions to an external
hotline are higher when the
Whistleblowing organization has a history of
intentions
poor responsiveness to
whistleblowing and when
participants are low on the
proactivity scale.

Table 1.3 - Summary of studies on characteristics of the wrongdoer
CITATION JOURNAL

RESEARCH
METHOD
2 by 2
betweensubjects
experimental
design

SAMPLE

INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

DEPENDENT
VARIABLES

57 Audit
seniors

Audit staff work
Whistleblowing
history, audit step
intentions
necessity

Kaplan
(1995)

Auditing: A
Journal of
Practice &
Theory

Robertson
et al.
(2011)

Behavioral
Research in
Accounting

2 by 2
betweensubjects
experimental
design

181
auditors

Likeability
reputation,
performance
reputation

Whistleblowing
intentions

Taylor and
Curtis
(2013)

Behavioral
Research in
Accounting

2 by 2
betweensubjects
experimental
design

106
seniorlevel
auditors

Organizational
Response, power
distance

whistleblowing
intentions

95

KEY RESULTS
Auditors’ reporting intention are
significantly stronger when the
wrongdoer has poor work history
and when the audit step is
necessary.
There is less reporting intention
when the wrongdoer has good
performance reputation than poor
performance reputation, and less
reporting intention when the
wrongdoer is more likeable.
Auditors’ are more likely to blow
the whistle when the wrongdoer
is a co-worker than when he is
the supervisor only if the
previous organizational response
is weak; if the organizational
response is strong, auditors are
more likely to report supervisor
than co-worker.

Table 1.4 - Summary of studies on characteristics of the wrongdoing
CITATION JOURNAL

RESEARCH
METHOD

SAMPLE

Kaplan and
Schultz
(2007)

Journal of
Business
Ethics

2 by 2 by 3
mixed design

90 MBA
students

Robinson
et al.
(2012)

Journal of
Business
Ethics

2 by 2
betweensubjects
design

Kaplan et
al. (2009)

Auditing: A
Journal of
Practice &
Theory

Kaplan et
al. (2011)

Auditing: A
Journal of
Practice &
Theory

INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES
Anonymous
reporting channel,
different fraud
cases

DEPENDENT
VARIABLES

KEY RESULTS

whistleblowing
intentions

Reporting intentions are lower
under financial statement fraud
than under theft case condition

181
auditors

Likeability
reputation,
performance
reputation

whistleblowing
intentions

2 by 2
betweensubjects
design

103 MBA
students

Procedural
safeguards (strong
or weak) and the
type of fraudulent
act

whistleblowing
intentions

2 by 2 by 2
betweensubjects
design

207 MBA
students

Type of fradulent
act, auditor
inquiry, reporting
channel

whistleblowing
intentions

96

Employees are less likely to
report: financial statement fraud
than theft; immaterial than
material financial
statement fraud
There is a stronger reporting
intention for misappropriation
of assets compared to
fraudulent financial reporting
only when the reporting channel
is anonymous.
There is no systematic
difference between the two
different types of fraudulent
acts, misappropriation of assets
and fraudulent financial, nor
does the type of fraudulent act
interact with whether the
auditor engages in inquiry or
the report recipient.

Brink et al.
(2013)

Auditing: A
Journal of
Practice &
Theory

2 by 2
betweensubjects
design

81 MBA
students

Strength of
Evidence, and
whistleblowing
Incentives

whistleblowing
intentions

Brink et al.
(2015b)

Advances in
Accounting
Behavioral
Research

2 by 2
betweensubjects
design

137 MBA
and
Masters
level
accounting
students

Strength of
evidence, other
employees
‘awareness of the
act

whistleblowing
intentions

Brink et al.
(2015a)

Journal of
Forensic and
Investigative
Accounting

2 by 1
betweensubjects
design

54
accounting
students

Wrongdoing
materiality,
personality traits,
and ethical
position

whistleblowing
intentions

97

The likelihood of reporting
internally is greater than to the
SEC. When evidence is strong,
internal rewards increase
reporting to SEC; and when
evidence is weak the presence
of an internal incentive
decreases SEC reporting
intentions.
When there is strong evidence
indicating a fraudulent act,
individuals with sole knowledge
are more likely to report than
when others are aware of the
fraudulent act (the bystander
effect). However, the bystander
effect is not found when
evidence of fraud is weak.
Materiality of the problem
influences witness’ reporting
intentions through its positive
association with higher
idealistic orientation and higher
levels of the alpha and beta
meta-traits.

Table 1.5 - Summary of studies on characteristics of the organization
CITATION JOURNAL

RESEARCH
SAMPLE
METHOD
2 by 2
68 graduate
betweenstudents
subjects

Wainberg
and
Perreault
(2016)

Behavioral
Research in
Accounting

Zhang et
al. (2013)

Auditing: A
Journal of
Practice &
Theory

2 by 2
betweensubjects

130 MBA
students

Taylor and
Curtis
(2013)

Behavioral
Research in
Accounting

2 by 2
betweensubjects

106 seniorlevel auditors

Dalton and
Radtke
(2013)

Journal of
Business
Ethics

2 by 1
between subjects

116 MBA
students

INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES
Anti-retaliation
policy and job
security

DEPENDENT
KEY RESULTS
VARIABLES
Whistleblowing Vivid anti-retaliation policy
intentions
may actually have the opposite
of the intended effect and
lowers whistleblower’ reporting
intention, because it increases
the salience of retaliatory
threats.
Anonymous
Whistleblowing When organizations have a
Hotline
intentions
history of negative outcome to
Administrator,
previous whistleblowers and
Previous
when witnesses are low on
Whistleblowing
proactivity scale, the witnesses
Outcomes
are less likely to report to
internal hotlines but more likely
to report to external hotline.
Organizational
Whistleblowing When organizational response
Response, power intentions
is strong, the witnesses are
distance
more likely to report
supervisors than peers. Without
strong organizational response,
they are more likely to report
peers than supervisors.
Machiavellianism Whistleblowing Organization’s ethical
and ethical
intentions
environment increases
environment
witnesses’ reporting especially
when the witnesses are high in
Machiavellianism.
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Xu and
Ziegenfuss
(2008)

Journal of
Business and
Psychology

2 by 1
betweensubjects

201 internal
auditors

Cash reward,
employment
contract reward

Brink et al.
(2013)

Auditing: A
Journal of
Practice &
Theory

2 by 2
betweensubjects

81 MBA
students

Internal reward
Incentives,
Strength of
Evidence

Seifert et
al. (2010)

Accounting,
2 by 2 by 2
Organizations betweenand Society
subjects

447 internal
auditors and
management
accountants

Organizational
justice

Brennan
and Kelly
(2007)

British
Accounting
Review

Survey

240 trainee
auditors

Organizational
structures

Lowe et al.
(2013)

Journal of
Business
Ethics

2 by 2
betweensubjects

76 MBA
students

Financial subcertification
procedure

99

Whistleblowing Internal auditors are more
intentions
likely to report wrongdoing
when cash reward or
employment contract reward
are provided
Whistleblowing The likelihood of reporting
intentions
internally is greater than to the
SEC. When evidence is strong,
internal rewards increase
reporting to SEC; and when
evidence is weak the presence
of an internal incentive
decreases SEC reporting
intentions.
Whistleblowing Organizational procedural
intentions
justice, distributive justice, and
interactional justice increase
the likelihood that an
organizational accountant
would internally report
financial statement fraud.
Whistleblowing Having formal structures is
intentions
positively associated with
employees’ reporting intention.
Training offered by
organization increases
employees’ reporting
confidence.
Whistleblowing The witnesses with knowledge
intentions
of a superior who committed a
fraudulent act and certified that
there is no fraud have lower
reporting intentions.

Appendix B

Linguistic Variables
Pronouns:
First person: I me mine my we us our ours
Second person: you your yours
Third person: He she him her his hers they them their theirs
Uncertainty words:
could may maybe might perhaps possibilities possibility possible possibly probabilistic
probabilities probability probable probably sometime sometimes somewhat somewhere
Tone:
Negativity: don’t disappoint disappoints disappointing disappointed disappointment risk risks
risky threat threats threaten threatened threatening penalty penalties negative negatives
negatively fail fails failed failing failure weak weakness weaknesses weaken weakens weakening
weakened difficult difficulty hurdle hurdles obstacle obstacles slump slumps slumping slumped
uncertain uncertainty uncertainties unsettled unfavorable downturn depressed down decrease
decreases decreasing decreased decline declines declining declined fall falls falling fell fallen
drop drops dropping dropped deteriorate deteriorates deteriorating deteriorated worsen worsens
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worsening worse worst low lower lowest less least smaller smallest shrink shrinks shrinking
shrunk below under challenge challenges challenging challenged poor poorly
Positivity: do pleased delighted reward rewards rewarding rewarded opportunity opportunities
enjoy enjoys enjoying enjoyed encouraged encouraging positive positives success successes
successful successfully succeed succeeds succeeding succeeded accomplish accomplishes
accomplishing accomplished accomplishment accomplishments strong strength strengths certain
certainty definite solid excellent stellar good leading achieve achieves achieved achieving
achievement achievements progress progressing deliver delivers delivered delivering leader
leading up increase increases increasing increased rise rises rising rose risen double doubled
doubles improve improves improving improved improvement improvements enhance enhances
enhanced enhancing enhancement enhancements strengthen strengthens strengthening
strengthened stronger strongest strongly better best more most above record high higher highest
greater greatest larger largest grow grows growing grew grown growth expand expands
expanding expanded expansion exceed exceeds exceeded exceeding beat beats beating
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Table 2.1 Content Characteristics
General content, scope, and tone
Executive letter

Importance of the policy

Comprehension aid

Executives opening letter
Executives pictures in the opening letter
Read and understand the policy
Read and understand the policy affirmation
Policy training
Policy Compliance affirmation
Understand the policy is the condition of employment
Q/A or FAQ
Case scenario
Decision assistance tool

Who, what, and where

Who is covered by the policy?

What is the responsibility?

Where to report?

Employees
Executives
Entire group
Board of directors
Contract worker or temporary worker
Business partners
Employee responsibility-ask questions
Employee responsibility-report concerns
Employee responsibility-report concerns even if no problem
found
Employee responsibility-report concerns in good faith
Managers responsibility-create environment
Managers responsibility-lead by example
Managers responsibility-maintain no retaliation policy
Managers responsibility-respond to report
Audit committee
Compliance or Ethics
Coworker
Finance/Accounting department
Executives
External auditor
Hotlines
Internal audit
Legal division
Supervisors
Ombudsperson
Security office
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Third Party
HR
Implicit order
Explicit order
Anonymous reporting

What is the reporting media?

Fax
Email
Mail
Phone
Text
Website

Investigation procedures, wrongdoer disciplinary action, and anti-retaliation policy
Investigation procedures-general statement
Investigation procedures-witness cooperation
Investigation procedures-witness no misleading information
Investigation procedures-punishment of witness misleading
Investigation procedures
investigation
Investigation procedures-corrective action mentioned
Investigation procedures-external investigation
issues(government)
Investigation procedures-confidentiality and anonymity

Wrongdoer

Anti-retaliation policy

Wrongdoers-including failure to report
Wrongdoers-including manager failure to detect
Wrongdoers-include managers ignorance
Mention of disciplinary action
Mention of disciplinary action-Termination of job
Mention of disciplinary action- legal punishment
Mention of disciplinary action- Monetary loss
Protection from retaliation- General statement
Protection from retaliation- Good Faith
Protection from retaliation- Good Faith-definition of good
faith
Protection from retaliation- Investigation
Protection from retaliation- list of retaliations
Protection from retaliation- Retaliation will be punished
Protection from retaliation- Retaliation will be punished-Job
termination
Protection from retaliation- Retaliation will be punishedlegal action
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Table 2.2 Content Characteristics Percent Out of the Total Sample
Panel A: General content, scope, and tone
n (total sample =

Percen

50)

t

Executives opening letter

39

78%

Executives pictures in the opening letter

29

58%

Read and understand the policy

39

78%

Importance of

Policy Compliance affirmation

16

32%

the policy

Policy training

30

60%

Understand the policy is the condition of

4

8%

Q/A or FAQ

32

64%

Comprehension

Case scenario

5

10%

aid

Decision assistance tool

31

62%

Employees

50

100%

Executives

4

8%

Who is covered

Entire group

21

42%

by the policy?

Board of directors

31

62%

Contract worker or temporary worker

18

36%

Business partners

14

28%

Employee responsibility-ask questions

43

86%

Employee responsibility-report concerns

49

98%

Employee responsibility-report concerns even

8

16%

General content, scope, and tone
Executive letter

employment

Panel B: Who, what, and where
Who, what, and where

no problem found
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Employee responsibility-report concerns in

25

50%

Managers responsibility-create environment

28

56%

Managers responsibility-lead by example

24

48%

What is the

Managers responsibility-maintain no

2

4%

responsibility?

retaliation policy
Managers responsibility-respond to report

23

46%

Audit committee

13

26%

Compliance or Ethics

41

82%

Coworker

2

4%

Where to

Finance/Accounting department

8

16%

report?

Executives

11

22%

External auditor

3

6%

Hotlines

11

22%

Internal audit

14

28%

Legal division

36

72%

Supervisors

48

96%

Ombudsperson

7

14%

Security office

9

18%

Third Party

15

30%

HR

40

80%

Implicit order

33

66%

Explicit order

11

22%

Anonymous reporting

42

84%

Fax

8

16%

Email

22

44%

What is the

Mail

18

36%

reporting

Phone

41

82%

media?

Text

1

2%

good faith
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Website

24

48%

Panel C: Investigation procedures, wrongdoer disciplinary action, and anti-retaliation
policy
Investigation procedures, wrongdoer disciplinary action, and anti-retaliation policy
Investigation procedures-general statement

33

66%

Investigation procedures-witness cooperation

31

62%

Investigation procedures-witness no

11

22%

6

12%

6

12%

9

18%

26

52%

Wrongdoers-including failure to report

13

26%

Wrongdoers-including managers’ failure to

4

8%

Wrongdoers-include managers’ ignorance

10

20%

Mention of disciplinary action

45

90%

Mention of disciplinary action-Termination of

42

84%

17

34%

Mention of disciplinary action- Monetary loss

4

8%

Protection from retaliation- General statement

48

96%

Protection from retaliation- Good Faith

41

82%

misleading information
Investigation

Investigation procedures-punishment of

procedures

witness misleading investigation
Investigation procedures-corrective action
mentioned
Investigation procedures-external investigation
issues(government)
Investigation procedures-confidentiality and
anonymity

Wrongdoer

detect

job
Mention of disciplinary action- legal
punishment

————
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Protection from retaliation- Good Faith-

9

18%

Protection from retaliation- Investigation

4

8%

Protection from retaliation- list of retaliations

10

20%

Protection from retaliation- Retaliation will be

18

36%

15

30%

4

8%

definition of good faith

Anti-retaliation
policy

punished
Protection from retaliation- Retaliation will be
punished-Job termination
Protection from retaliation- Retaliation will be
punished-legal action
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Table 2.3 Content Characteristics in Companies' Internal Whistleblowing Policy
Panel A: Content Characteristics Words Percent
Number of words

Percent

11,074

9.8%

4,555
32,571

4.0%
28.8%

3,866

3.4%

14,540
24,534

12.8%
21.7%

5,006

4.4%

General content, scope, and tone
Executive letter
Importance of the
policy
Comprehension aid
Who, what, and
where
Who is covered by
the policy?
What is the
responsibility?
Where to report?
What is the
reporting media?

Investigation procedures, wrongdoer disciplinary action, and anti-retaliation policy
Investigation
procedures
5,928
5.2%
Wrongdoer
disciplinary action
3,861
3.4%
Anti-retaliation
policy
7,239
6.4%
Total

113,174

100.0%

Panel B: Content Characteristics Words Percent within Each Content Category
Number of
words
General content, scope, and tone

Importance of the
policy

Comprehension aid

Percent

Read and understand the policy
Read and understand the policy affirmation
Policy training
Policy Compliance affirmation
Understand the policy is the condition of
employment
Total

1,619
716
1,620
490

35.5%
15.7%
35.6%
10.8%

110
4,555

2.4%
100.0%

Q
A

9,811
17,561

30.1%
53.9%
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Case scenario
Decision assistance tool
Total

2,011
3,188
32,571

6.2%
9.8%
100.0%

Employees
Executives
Entire group
Board of directors
Contract worker or temporary worker
Business partners
Total

1,249
107
649
873
366
622
3,866

32.3%
2.8%
16.8%
22.6%
9.5%
16.1%
100.0%

Employee responsibility-ask questions
Employee responsibility-report concerns
Employee responsibility-report concerns even no
problem found
Employee responsibility-report concerns in good
faith
Employee responsibility total
Managers responsibility-creat environment
Managers responsibility-lead by example
Managers responsibility-maintain no retaliation
policy
Managers responsibility-respond to report
Managers responsibility total
Employee and manager responsibility total

2,642
7,233

18.2%
49.7%

459

3.2%

881
11,215
1,004
690

6.1%
77.1%
6.9%
4.7%

140
1,491
3,325
14,540

1.0%
10.3%
22.9%
100.0%

Anonymous reporting
Audit committee
Compliance or Ethics
Coworker
Executives
External auditor
Finance/Accounting department
Hotlines
HR
Internal audit
Legal division
Ombudsperson
Security office
Supervisors
Third Party

3,048
622
4,053
1
224
60
104
6,137
1,825
341
2,435
757
275
3,819
833

12.4%
2.5%
16.5%
0.0%
0.9%
0.2%
0.4%
25.0%
7.4%
1.4%
9.9%
3.1%
1.1%
15.6%
3.4%

Who, what, and
where

Who is covered by
the policy?

What is the
responsibility?

Where to report?
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What is the
reporting media?

Total

24,534

100.0%

Email
Fax
Mail
Phone
Text
Website
Total

792
406
998
1,721
6
1,083
5,006

15.8%
8.1%
19.9%
34.4%
0.1%
21.6%
100.0%

Investigation procedures, wrongdoer disciplinary action, and anti-retaliation policy
Investigation procedures-general statement
1,903
Investigation procedures-witness cooperation
1,002
Investigation procedures-witness no misleading
information
382
Investigation procedures-punishment of witness
misleading investigation
177
Investigation
Investigation procedures-corrective action
procedures
mentioned
204
Investigation procedures-external investigation
issues(government)
776
Investigation procedures-confidentiality and
anonymity
1,484
Total
5,928

Wrongdoer

Anti-retaliation
policy

————

32.1%
16.9%
6.4%
3.0%
3.4%
13.1%
25.0%
100.0%

Wrongdoers-including failure to report
Wrongdoers-including manager failure to detect
Wrongdoers-include managers’ ignorance
Mention of disciplinary action
Mention of disciplinary action-Termination of job
Mention of disciplinary action- legal punishment
Mention of disciplinary action- Monetary loss
Total

245
65
233
1,415
1,227
559
117
3,861

6.3%
1.7%
6.0%
36.6%
31.8%
14.5%
3.0%
100.0%

Protection from retaliation- General statement
Protection from retaliation- Good Faith
Protection from retaliation- Good Faith-definition
of good faith
Protection from retaliation- Investigation
Protection from retaliation- list of retaliations
Protection from retaliation- Retaliation will be
punished

3,371
1,896

46.6%
26.2%

309
74
367

4.3%
1.0%
5.1%

646

8.9%
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Protection from retaliation- Retaliation will be
punished-Job termination
Protection from retaliation- Retaliation will be
punished-legal action
Total

111

416

5.7%

160
7,239

2.2%
100.0%

Table 2.4: Linguistic Characteristics in Companies' Internal Whistleblowing Policy
Panel A: Linguistic Characteristics Percentage

Pronouns
Uncertainty Words
Linguistic Tone
Total words in the policy

n (number of words)

Percent

5,463

4.8%

760

0.7%

1,856

1.6%

113,174

100.0%

Panel B: Linguistic Characteristics within Pronouns and Linguistic Tone

Pronouns

n (number of words)

Percent

1,588

29.1%

First person plural

970

17.8%

Total first person

2,558

46.8%

Second person

2,332

42.7%

185

3.4%

Third person plural

388

7.1%

Total third person

573

10.5%

5,463

100.0%

Negative

295

15.9%

Positive

1,561

84.1%

Total linguistic tone

1,856

100.0%

First person
singular

Third person
singular

Total pronouns
Linguistic Tone
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Table 2.5: The Content Characteristics in Executives' Opening Letter
Executive letter(C-Coefficient)
Importance of the policy

0.41

Comprehension aid

0.01

Who is covered by the policy?

0.13

What is the responsibility?

0.41

Where to report?

0.39

What is the reporting media?

0.03

Investigation procedures

0

Wrongdoer disciplinary action

0

Anti-retaliation policy

0.14

Table 2.6: The Content Characteristics in Q/A Comprehension Aid
Q/A(C-Coefficient)
Importance of the policy

0

Who is covered by the policy?

0.13

What is the responsibility?

0.39

Where to report?

0.39

What is the reporting media?

0.03

Investigation procedures

0

Wrongdoer disciplinary action

0

Anti-retaliation policy

0
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Table 2.7: Percentage of Linguistic Characteristics in Each Content Characteristic
Panel A: Percentage of Types of Pronouns in Each Content Characteristic
First person
Second person
Third person Total pronouns
Percen

Total

Executives
opening letter

n

n

11,07

81

4

7

Importance of

Percent

Percent

Percent

(n/total

(n/total

(n/total

(n/total

n)

n

n)

n

n)

n

n)

1,04
7.4%

193

1.7%

37

0.3%

7

9.5%

3.0%

69

1.5%

60

1.3%

264

5.8%

13

the policy

4,555

5

Comprehension

32,57

95

1

2

aid

t

Who is covered

1,31
2.9%

262

0.8%

97

0.3%

1

4.0%

2.8%

6

0.2%

32

0.8%

147

3.8%

0.7%

793

5.5%

10

by the policy?

3,866

9

What is the

14,54

21

0

4

24,53

13

4

1

0.5%

1,018

4.1%

0

0.7%

9

5.4%

5,006

27

0.5%

116

2.3%

6

0.1%

149

3.0%

5,928

55

0.9%

103

1.7%

9

0.2%

167

2.8%

3,861

39

1.0%

7

0.2%

12

0.3%

58

1.5%

7,239

79

1.1%

86

1.2%

43

0.6%

208

2.9%

responsibility?

Where to report?

10
1.5%

472

3.2%

7
17

1,31

What is the
reporting media?
Investigation
procedures
Wrongdoer
disciplinary
action
Anti-retaliation
policy
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Panel B: Percentage of Uncertainty Words and Linguistic Tone in Each Content
Characteristic
Uncertainly
Negative
Positive
Percent
Percent
Percent
Total n
n
(n/total n)
n
(n/total n)
n
(n/total n)
Executives opening
11,074
letter
27
0.2%
23
0.2%
304
2.7%
Importance of the
policy
4,555
11
0.2%
13
0.3%
30
0.7%
Comprehension aid 32,571
38
0.1%
36
0.1%
334
1.0%
Who is covered by
the policy?
3,866
10
0.3%
0
0.0%
31
0.8%
What is the
responsibility?
14,540 119
0.8%
37
0.3%
227
1.6%
Where to report?
24,534 271
1.1%
51
0.2%
228
0.9%
What is the
reporting media?
5,006
39
0.8%
2
0.0%
41
0.8%
Investigation
procedures
5,928
78
1.3%
23
0.4%
48
0.8%
Wrongdoer
disciplinary action
3,861 112
2.9%
93
2.4%
92
2.4%
Anti-retaliation
policy
7239
55
0.8%
15
0.2%
133
1.8%
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Figure 2.1: The Overlaps Between Types of Pronouns and
Content Characteristics
8.0%
7.0%
6.0%
5.0%
4.0%
3.0%
2.0%
1.0%
0.0%

First person

Second person

Third person

Figure 2.2: The Overlaps Between Content Characteristics and
Uncertainty words and Linguistic Tone
3.50%
3.00%
2.50%
2.00%
1.50%
1.00%
0.50%
0.00%

Uncertainty words

Negative
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Positive

Table 2.8: The Usage of Fictitious Third-person and Generic Third-person in Q/A
Fictitious third person
Generic third person
Total

n (n= number of codes)
18
3
21
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Percent
86%
14%
100%

Appendix C

TABLE 3.1
Participant Demographic Information
(all participants: n = 163)
(successful participants: n = 136)
Panel A: Means and Standard Deviation

Age
Mean
Std. Dev.
Years of Work Experience
Mean
Std. Dev.
Panel B: Frequencies and Percentages

Gender
Female
Male
Education
Undergraduate
Graduate
Have discovered a person of greater authority
engaging in questionable behavior?
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All Participants

Retained
Participants

27.8
6.9

28.1
7.1

5.1
6.0

5.5
5.9

All Participants

Retained
Participants

48%
52%

55%
45%

32%
68%

28%
72%

23.8%

25.2%

TABLE 3.2
Descriptive Statistics for Exit Questions
(Retained participants: n = 136)
Mean (Std.
Dev.)
Panel A: Reporting Intentions
How likely is it that you would report the CFO’s fraudulent act?
(0–10, where 10 = definitely would report)
How likely is it that someone in Rowan’s position would report the CFO’s
fraudulent act? (0–10, where 10 = definitely would report)
Panel C: Respondent Attitude Questions
Please indicate the seriousness (i.e., the amount of harm done) by the
fraudulent act in the case. (1-7, where 7 = very serious)
Please indicate Rowan’s personal cost of reporting the fraudulent act.
(1-7, where 7 = very high)
Please indicate how likely it is that there would be negative repercussions for
Rowan if he reports the fraud. (1-7, where 7 = very likely)
Please indicate the likelihood that reporting the issue would harm Rowan’s
chances of being promoted at the firm. (1-7, where 7 = very likely)
Please indicate the likelihood that there would be any form of retaliation
against Rowan if he reports the fraud. (1-7, where 7 = very likely)
Please indicate Rowan’s responsibility (duty or obligation) to report the
fraudulent act. (1-7, where 7 = very high)
Please indicate the likelihood that you believe the company will thoroughly
investigate the act if it is reported. (1-7, where 7 = very likely)
Please indicate the likelihood you believe the company will correct the
questionable act if the act is reported. (1-7, where 7 = very likely)
Please indicate the level of disciplinary action facing the CFO if the
questionable act is reported. (1-7, where 7 = very high)
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8.26 (1.94)
6.34 (2.10)

6.03 (1.15)
4.21 (1.97)
3.87 (1.72)
3.99 (1.77)
3.96 (1.64)
6.41 (0.83)
4.93 (1.49)
4.94 (1.48)
5.39 (1.52)

TABLE 3.3
Language Vividness and Risk Aversion
(Retained participants: n = 136)
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Mean
(Std. Dev.)
Language Vividness
1. How precise XOTLE’s policy for reporting unethical conduct is?
(1-7, where 7 = very precise)
2. How clear XOTLE’s policy for reporting unethical conduct is?
(1-7, where 7 = very clear)
3. How specific XOTLE’s policy for reporting unethical conduct is?
(1-7, where 7 = very precise)
4. Do you feel that XOTLE’s policy for reporting unethical conduct is
applicable to you? (1-7, where 7 = very applicable)
Risk Aversion

5.43 (1.35)
5.59 (1.42)

5.44 (1.35)

5. Betting a day’s income at a sporting event. (G)
6. Investing 10% of your annual income in a new business venture. (I)
Panel B: Measurement Reliability

1.81 (1.40)

4
39

Risk Aversion

0.88
0.88

1.41 (0.93)

Language Vividness

0.88

5.20 (1.54)

1. Betting a day’s income at the horse races. (G)
2. Investing 10% of your annual income in a moderate growth mutual
fund. (I)
3. Betting a day’s income at a high-stake poker game. (G)
4. Investing 5% of your annual income in a very speculative stock. (I)

Number of
Items

Factor
loading

5.21 (1.55)
1.75 (1.37)
3.47 (1.71)
4.23 (1.74)

0.51
0.82
0.09
0.80
0.25
0.81
0.33

Cronbach’s
alpha
(standardized)
0.81
0.76

Note: I = investment, G = gambling

9

Weber et al. (2002) documented that the difference between these two domains is the level of control over the risk,
and financial gambling risk is less controllable than financial investment risk. In our study, the risk involves the
possibility of retaliation from the firm, which is difficult to control. Thus, I retain only the financial gambling risk
domain items (the first, third, and fifth item) for future analysis.

120

TABLE 3.4
Panel A: Means (Std. Deviation) for Reporting Likelihood
Anti-retaliation Policy
First-person Pronoun Third-person
Pronoun
8.65(1.59)
8.51(1.76)
n = 34
n = 35

Total

Third-person
Pronoun

7.71(2.22)
n = 33

8.15(2.09)
n = 34

7.93(2.15)
n = 67

Total

8.19(1.97)
n = 67

8.33(1.92)
n =69

df

F

Sig.

3

Mean
Square
5.90

1.58

Reporting Policy 14.41
Pronouns

1

14.41

3.87

0.2
0
0.0
5

Anti-Retaliation
Policy Pronouns

1

0.78

0.21

0.6
5

1

2.74

0.74

0.3
9

132

3.72

Reporting Policy First-person
Pronoun

Panel B: ANOVA Results
Source
Sum of
Squares
Corrected Model 17.70

0.78

Reporting Policy
Pronouns *
Anti-Retaliation 2.74
Policy Pronouns
Error

491.29

8.57(1.67)
n = 69

Total
9790.25
136
Corrected Total 508.98
135
Dependent Variable: ‘‘How likely is it that you would report the CFO’s fraudulent act?’’
scaled using an 11-point ascending scale (endpoints labeled ‘‘Extremely Unlikely’’ and
‘‘Extremely
Likely’’).
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-0.31*

Reporting Policy
Pronouns

Language
Vividness

-.31* (-.14)

0.55*

Reporting
Intentions

Figure 3.1: Standard regression coefficients for the relationship between Reporting Policy
Pronouns and Reporting Intentions as mediated by Language Vividness. The standardized
regression coefficient between Reporting Policy Pronouns and Reporting Intentions, controlling
for Language Vividness, is in parentheses.
*p < 0.05
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XOTLE, Inc. Overview
XOTLE, Inc. is an oilseed refining company that was founded in 1987. The company
employs approximately 2,000 employees and is listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Over
the past few years, the company’s operating results were steady and slightly below the industry
average.
Rowan Geoffrey is an accountant who works in the Finance department of XOTLE, Inc.
Rowan’s responsibilities include booking and recording accounting entries related to operating
expenses and preparing related operating financial reports. After finishing his financial reports,
he sends them to Gilbert Elias, the CFO of the company, for review.
On January 4th, 2014, Rowan was looking over 2013’s financial report. He realized that
the marketing expenses number was significantly lower in the final financial report than what he
originally reported to Elias (the CFO). Rowan went back to review the entries and found that a
significant amount of marketing expenditures were capitalized as assets rather than being
expensed. In his original work, Rowan had recorded all of these marketing expenditures as
expenses. However, Elias reclassified the expenses as assets. Rowan had not received any
notification or explanation for this change.
In prior years, similar marketing expenditures were always expensed. No changes were
made to the marketing strategy in 2013. According to U.S. GAAP, these types of marketing
expenditures should be expensed. Capitalizing the marketing expenditures understated expenses
and overstated profit. Further, due to the capitalization of the expenditures, the 2013 earnings per
share (EPS) ratio increased from $0.89 to $0.91. Therefore, Rowan is fairly confident that Elias
(CFO) engaged in fraudulent financial reporting by changing the classification of the marketing
expenditures.
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The following is XOTLE’s policy of unethical conducts reporting.
Q: If I detect [an employee detects] unethical/fraudulent acts, what is my [his/her]
responsibility to speak up? How should I [he/she] raise a concern?
A: You [He/She] must speak up promptly if there is any reason to suspect that anyone in the
company has violated company policies or local laws. Your [His/Her] report will be taken
seriously and investigated appropriately. It is better to report a suspicion that turns out not to be
an issue than to ignore a possible violation of the law or Company policy.
To comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, XOTLE, Inc. maintains an anonymous reporting
hotline for whistle blowers. You are [He/She is] encouraged to call the hotline. The hotline is
administered by the internal auditors of XOTLE, Inc. The hotline is available 24 hours a day and
365 days a year. The telephone calls made to the hotline are to be reported to the audit committee
for further investigation. The identity and any information about the you [him/her] will be kept
strictly confidential.
Q: If I report [an employee reports] a fraud, will I [he/she] be protected from retaliation?
A: All responses are kept anonymous. You [He/she] will not be subject to intimidation or
retaliation. This includes being left out, managerial or coworker abuse, threatening behavior,
harassment, loss of job or promotion, or any other professional, personal, or financial form of
retaliation both now and in the future.
If you believe [he/she believes] that you are [he/she is] being retaliated against, you [he/she]
should report such conduct immediately to the Human Resources Department. Any individual
who unlawfully discriminates or retaliates against you [him/her] as a result of the protected
actions may be subject to disciplinary action, up to and including immediate termination.
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PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS REGARDING THE CASE IN THE
ORDER LISTED. DO NOT GO BACK AND CHANGE YOUR ANSWERS. YOU MAY
REFER BACK TO THE CASE MATERIALS IF YOU WISH.
FOR THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS, PLEASE CIRCLE THE NUMBER OR OPTION
THAT CORRESPONDS WITH YOUR ANSWER.
1.

0%

Given this situation, how likely is it that someone in Rowan’s position would report the
CFO’s fraudulent act?
10%

20%

30%

40%

No Likelihood
Likelihood
(Definitely would
not report)
2.

0%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Moderate

High

Likelihood

(Definitely would
report)

Now imagine you are facing this situation. How likely is it that you would report the CFO’s
fraudulent act?
10%

20%

30%

40%

No Likelihood
Likelihood
(Definitely would
not report)

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Moderate

High

Likelihood

(Definitely would
report)

3. How would you rate XOTLE’s policy for reporting unethical conduct?
Very Vague
1
2
3
4
5
6
Precise

7

Very

Very Unclear

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very Clear

Not at all Specific
Specific

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very

4. Do you feel that XOTLE’s policy for reporting unethical conduct is applicable to you?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not at all Applicable
Neutral
Very
Applicable

5. Does XOTLE have a reporting hotline for whistle blowers? Yes______ No ______
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6. Please indicate the seriousness (i.e., the amount of harm done) by the fraudulent act in the
case.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Very Low
Neutral
Very
High
7. Please indicate Rowan’s personal cost of reporting the fraudulent act.
1
2
3
4
5
7
Very Small
Neutral
Large

6
Very

8. Please indicate how likely it is that there would be negative repercussions for Rowan if he
reports the fraud.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Very Unlikely
Neutral
Very Likely
9. Please indicate the likelihood that reporting the issue would harm Rowan’s chances of being
promoted at the firm.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Very Low
Neutral
Very High
10. Please indicate the likelihood that there would be any form of retaliation against Rowan if he
reports the fraud.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Very Low
Neutral
Very High
11. Please indicate Rowan’s responsibility (duty or obligation) to report the fraudulent act.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Very Low
Neutral
Very High
12. Please indicate the likelihood that you believe the company will thoroughly investigate the
act if it is reported.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Very Unlikely
Neutral
Very Likely
13. Please indicate the likelihood you believe the company will correct the questionable act if the
act is reported.
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1

2

3

4

5

6

7
Very Unlikely

Neutral

Very Likely

14. Please indicate the level of disciplinary action facing the CFO if the questionable act is
reported.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Very Low
Neutral
Very High

a. Betting a day’s income at the horse races.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

Investing 10% of your annual income in a
moderate growth mutual fund.
Betting a day’s income at a high-stake
poker game.
Investing 5% of your annual income in a
very speculative stock.
Betting a day’s income at a sporting
event
Investing 10% of your annual income in a
new business venture

16. What is your current age? ______
17. Please indicate your gender:

________ Male

________ Female

18. Is English your first language?

________ Yes

________ No

19. How many years of professional work experience do you have? _______
20. Which program are you in?
B.S. in Accounting _____
Master of Accountancy _____
Post-baccalaureate certificate in Accounting _____
Master of Business Administration (MBA)_____
Other _____
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Moderate
ly Likely
Extremel
y
Likely

Somewha
t Likely

t Unlikely
Not Sure

Extremel
y Unlikely
Moderate
ly
Unlikely
Somewha

15. Please indicate your likelihood of engaging in each activity or behavior, and check the box
the extent to which you agree.

21. What is your highest level of education completed?
High School _____
Some College _____
Associates Degree _____
Bachelor Degree _____
Some Graduate School _____
Master Degree or Higher _____
22. Do you hold any of the following designations? (Check all that apply)
CPA _____

CIA _____

CMA_____

Other_____

None_____

23. Which group best represents your race or ethnicity?
White___

Black/African American____

Asian_____

Hispanic_____

Other____

24. Have you discovered a person of greater authority engaging in questionable or wrongful
behavior? YES____
NO_____
If so, did you take action to report that behavior?
YES____
NO_____
N/A_____
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